# CEDA Round 3 v UT-Dallas MV

## 1NC

### Agambo

#### Drones are a minor symptom of US militarism- the aff’s myopic focus solves nothing but obscures the bigger picture and enables militarism

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[Daniel, "Drones are a symptom, not a cause," 5-23-12, slouchingcolumbia.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/drones-are-a-symptom-not-a-cause/, accessed 9-2-13, mss]

Drones have yet to be used in a situation where a pilot of a manned strike platform would have been at serious risk from something besides a plane crash. In practice, in these kinds of campaigns the most vulnerable people are those operating on the ground to support drone operations, and more of them, not fewer of them, are brought in to support so-called drone wars. But does the lack of accident threat increase bellicosity? Not really, since again, in virtually all theaters of drone use, drone strikes occur where manned strikes or manned ISR support is also occurring. These aircraft are also at accident risk, yet they are often used alongside drones or to fulfill missions that drones also carry out. While again, on paper, drones remove these risk, in practice the kind of missions policymakers employ drones with does not suggest drones have significantly changed their calculus towards waging standoff strike campaigns. Policymakers are relying on drones The United States is only “relying” on drones in Pakistan, and even then, in Pakistan it’s also operating Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams on the ground and other proxy militia forces, and very likely receiving the kind of manned ISR support that drones very frequently do in Afghanistan (along with strike support in that theater, of course). The “unique capabilities” of drones do not change the calculus to actually initiate military action, they just change the relative logistical load of the operation. That’s not a revolution and that’s hardly enough evidence to suggest it significantly effects U.S. bellicosity or the accountability of warmaking by giving policymakers a cost free option for prosecuting strikes. In Yemen and Somalia, policymakers almost certainly are not relying on drones. The first drone strikes in Somalia did not occur until years after the U.S. had begun using JSOC ground forces, helicopters, gunships, and naval aircraft and ship fires to target the ICU and later al Shabaab. Even then, drones have yet to actually take over the duties of strike missions, as the F-15E squadron in Djibouti suggests. In Yemen, the strikes have generally been a mix of platforms that has ranged from drones, to seaborne fire missions, to manned aircraft. So it’s certainly not an undisputed fact that policymakers are relying on drones, even if this factor is publicly played up by the media and government alike. If anything, drones are over-emphasized to hide the very many people operating on the ground and in manned supporting strike and ISR platforms that are involved in these wars. It’s absolutely false to suggest that it’s casualty aversion or drone expendability which enables these conflicts, or otherwise policymakers would not be using manned missions in Yemen and Somalia (and they would probably be more willing to conduct high-value strikes when Pakistan clamps down on strikes). Farley suggests that policymakers are not casualty tolerant of air wars. This is false. In fact, the utter air superiority of U.S. forces has been invoked for the ease of conducting U.S. airpower interventions in the Balkans and Iraq after 1991. There’s significant evidence to suggest that policymakers consider aerial and naval assets writ large, along with deniable and covert SOF assets, more expendable than regular ground troops from the Army and the USMC. The record of U.S. military interventions suggests this. Casualty aversion from ground troops did not prevent the growth of an airpower mystique among policymakers which allowed for interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq between 1991-2003, and later, Libya. The punitive use of aerial and standoff fires is extended to virtually all aerial assets, and in many cases policymakers are more eager to send manned aircraft against enemy air defenses than they are to send unmanned strike aircraft into contested areas. If Farley was arguing, as many other commentators have, that there is a general airpower mystique, that would be a much more plausible argument. But the conduct of U.S. military interventions since 1991 suggests that policymakers are not very worried about pilot casualties (even after the shoot-down of an F-16 in Bosnia and an F-117 in the Kosovo War), and drone strikes rarely occur when there’s a real threat of pilot casualties beyond the accidents that can afflict the manned strike and ISR assets used alongside them. Drones make policymakers more prone to use force This is highly unlikely. As I have noted, in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan, drone use has been dependent on both militarily and diplomatically permissive environments, and they are generally used alongside [non-drone]manned assets, proxy forces, special operations, and security force assistance to other states. In other words, there are a variety of militarized options which are employed concomitantly which all suggest drone strikes were not the limiting factor in the U.S. choosing to find a variety of direct and indirect methods for covertly and overtly killing foes determined to be hostile to the country. Secondly, the fact that the U.S. also uses the Pursuit Teams and other covert actors in Pakistan suggests that the U.S. would still be trying to kill its enemies across the borders if drones were not available. In Yemen there isn’t convincing evidence that drones are the reason the U.S. chose to militarize its policy there, as the increase in strikes starting in 2009 came with an increase in [non-drone]manned and naval strikes. In Somalia, drones are definitively not the reason the U.S. chose to militarize its counterterrorism policy there, as U.S. strikes in support of the American-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006 were all of a manned variety. Thirdly, there’s little suggestion that drones are blinding policymakers to the virtues of riskier means of force, an example of which that Farley cites is SOF. But SOCOM has expanded enormously alongside the growth of the drone program, and SOCOM and JSOC are operating on the ground in far far more countries than we use drones! Not only that, but JSOC, CIA SAD operators, and proxy forces such as contractors, militia groups and foreign military forces are all in play in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. Standoff strikes are always and everywhere just one prong of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy – even the kinetic aspects. If anything, the biggest advantage to policymakers of drones, in terms of initiating and continuing use of force, is that they allow policymakers to obscure and misinform the public and the international community – and each other – as to the extent of the military and covert campaign. But that’s not drones eluding accountability and enabling bellicosity, it’s secrecy and the management of public perceptions. The CIA had methods of doing this thing before today’s remotely-operated weapons were invented. Back in the day, when you wanted to avoid the bad publicity of USAF or USN platforms getting formally involved in “shadow wars” (and they often were anyway, as they very obviously are now), you started a secret air force. Former USAF or USN airframes, crewed and often even supported by foreign nationals or deniable covert operators. This was what happened in Cuba and the Congo. Drones make very little difference in the ability of policymakers to militarize U.S. foreign policy approaches. They are insufficient for action in military impermissive airspace, and they are almost always used alongside manned assets, and they are always used alongside covert ground or proxy forces. This is why I greatly admire the work of national security journalists (the first coming to mind being Jeremy Scahill and Marc Ambinder and D.B. Grady) who sketch out not simply the new hotness that is killer robots, but the full spectrum of direct and indirect methods that are by necessity and by preference used along side drone attacks, such as SOF, manned platforms, naval assets, spies, mercenaries, unsavory foreign security services, militias, warlords, and even terrorists previously targeted by the U.S. to attack America’s real and imagined enemies in places like Yemen and Somalia. Criticism that exalts the mythical capabilities of drones to conduct cost-free, casualty-free campaigns in fact enables to prosecution of unaccountable wars. Why? Because it’s not having the option of drones which make the policymakers responsible for determining the mission and demanding warheads put to foreheads decide to do so. If it was, then we’d see being drones used in the expendable, cost-free ways that our comprehensive strike campaigns and covert wars suggest is not occurring. Instead, the exaltation of these game-changing features of drones, which will be eagerly swallowed by the broader public, if not by critics of the war on terror, is often parroted by the fears of drone critics, which give policymakers the ability to obscure the extent of the “drone wars” and what is really going on. It’s not drones that decrease accountability or increase bellicosity. It’s secrecy and bureaucratic politics. Drones don’t truly offer any advantages in terms of secrecy or bureaucratic politics that did not already exist or are not being cultivated alongside drones by other branches of the military and intelligence community. Even the much-vaunted ability that drones give the CIA to conduct military-grade “secret wars” was pioneered aerially by the “instant air forces” of the Cold War that it set up, as well as other proxy assets with which the CIA can emply and is now employing in its modern shadow conflicts. The very same compartmentalization and secrecy that protect the drone campaign also protects the activities of [non-drone]manned strike missions, SOCOM, CIA assets, and U.S.-backed proxy forces. Drones only marginally alter the kind of impunity that U.S. air superiority gave American policymakers to launch its airpower interventions of the 1990s and 2000s (themselves, as Carl Schmitt foresaw in the 1950s, an outgrowth of naval technology). What’s at least slightly novel about these campaigns is the way in which bureaucracies and secrecy have been utilized to obscure policymakers use of all manner of overt and covert strike, ground, intelligence and proxy assets from proxy criticism, even though even this was essentially cultivated during the Cold War. Perhaps some day in the future drone capabilities will improve enough that they will actually encourage the lack of accountability and bellicosity that critics blame for them. But the record of drone usage so far suggests that the evasions of accountability and enablings of bellicosity in question are equally available to [non-drone]manned assets, standoff naval assets, and deniable covert assets. Drones have yet to be responsible for a single militarization of a U.S. CT campaign that would not have been militarized by the concomitant use of other assets. They’re a symptom of the post-Iraq decision to conduct comprehensive shadow conflicts against AQAM ( arguably pioneered in the Horn of Africa long before strike drones showed up), not from what we can observe in the conduct of drones so far, a cause of its direction. They are a useful instrument in the toolbox. But it’s the toolbox, not any one tool in it, that’s shaping policy. Giving the drones the kind of hype they receive from critics and proponents alike shifts debate obscures what’s really allowing policymakers to conduct today’s wars.

[Matt note: gender-modified]

#### Sanitization of US policy leads to endless violence and imperialism – turns case

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[A. J., retired career officer in the United States Army, former director of Boston University's Center for International Relations (from 1998 to 2005), The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War, 2005 accessed 9-4-13, mss]

Today as never before in their history Americans are enthralled with military power. The global military supremacy that the United States presently enjoys--and is bent on perpetuating-has become central to our national identity. More than America's matchless material abundance or even the effusions of its pop culture, the nation's arsenal of high-tech weaponry and the soldiers who employ that arsenal have come to signify who we are and what we stand for. When it comes to war, Americans have persuaded themselves that the United States possesses a peculiar genius. Writing in the spring of 2003, the journalist Gregg Easterbrook observed that "the extent of American military superiority has become almost impossible to overstate." During Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces had shown beyond the shadow of a doubt that they were "the strongest the world has ever known, . . . stronger than the Wehrmacht in r94o, stronger than the legions at the height of Roman power." Other nations trailed "so far behind they have no chance of catching up. ""˜ The commentator Max Boot scoffed at comparisons with the German army of World War II, hitherto "the gold standard of operational excellence." In Iraq, American military performance had been such as to make "fabled generals such as Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian seem positively incompetent by comparison." Easterbrook and Booz concurred on the central point: on the modern battlefield Americans had located an arena of human endeavor in which their flair for organizing and deploying technology offered an apparently decisive edge. As a consequence, the United States had (as many Americans have come to believe) become masters of all things military. Further, American political leaders have demonstrated their intention of tapping that mastery to reshape the world in accordance with American interests and American values. That the two are so closely intertwined as to be indistinguishable is, of course, a proposition to which the vast majority of Americans subscribe. Uniquely among the great powers in all of world history, ours (we insist) is an inherently values-based approach to policy. Furthermore, we have it on good authority that the ideals we espouse represent universal truths, valid for all times. American statesmen past and present have regularly affirmed that judgment. In doing so, they validate it and render it all but impervious to doubt. Whatever momentary setbacks the United States might encounter, whether a generation ago in Vietnam or more recently in Iraq, this certainty that American values are destined to prevail imbues U.S. policy with a distinctive grandeur. The preferred language of American statecraft is bold, ambitious, and confident. Reflecting such convictions, policymakers in Washington nurse (and the majority of citizens tacitly endorse) ever more grandiose expectations for how armed might can facilitate the inevitable triumph of those values. In that regard, George W. Bush's vow that the United States will "rid the world of evil" both echoes and amplifies the large claims of his predecessors going at least as far back as Woodrow Wilson. Coming from Bush the war- rior-president, the promise to make an end to evil is a promise to destroy, to demolish, and to obliterate it. One result of this belief that the fulfillment of America's historic mission begins with America's destruction of the old order has been to revive a phenomenon that C. Wright Mills in the early days of the Cold War described as a "military metaphysics"-a tendency to see international problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a solution except through military means. To state the matter bluntly, Americans in our own time have fallen prey to militarism, manifesting itself in a romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure of national greatness, and outsized expectations regarding the efficacy of force. To a degree without precedent in U.S. history, Americans have come to define the nation's strength and well-being in terms of military preparedness, military action, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals? Already in the 19905 America's marriage of a militaristic cast of mind with utopian ends had established itself as the distinguishing element of contemporary U.S. policy. The Bush administrations response to the hor- rors of 9/11 served to reaffirm that marriage, as it committed the United States to waging an open-ended war on a global scale. Events since, notably the alarms, excursions, and full-fledged campaigns comprising the Global War on Terror, have fortified and perhaps even sanctified this marriage. Regrettably, those events, in particular the successive invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, advertised as important milestones along the road to ultimate victory have further dulled the average Americans ability to grasp the significance of this union, which does not serve our interests and may yet prove our undoing. The New American Militarism examines the origins and implications of this union and proposes its annulment. Although by no means the first book to undertake such an examination, The New American Militarism does so from a distinctive perspective. The bellicose character of U.S. policy after 9/11, culminating with the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, has, in fact, evoked charges of militarism from across the political spectrum. Prominent among the accounts advancing that charge are books such as The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, by Chalmers Johnson; Hegemony or Survival: Americas Quest for Global Dominance, by Noam Chomsky; Masters of War; Militarism and Blowback in the Era of American Empire, edited by Carl Boggs; Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions, by Clyde Prestowitz; and Incoherent Empire, by Michael Mann, with its concluding chapter called "The New Militarism." Each of these books appeared in 2003 or 2004. Each was not only writ- ten in the aftermath of 9/11 but responded specifically to the policies of the Bush administration, above all to its determined efforts to promote and justify a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. As the titles alone suggest and the contents amply demonstrate, they are for the most part angry books. They indict more than explain, and what- ever explanations they offer tend to be ad hominem. The authors of these books unite in heaping abuse on the head of George W Bush, said to combine in a single individual intractable provincialism, religious zealotry, and the reckless temperament of a gunslinger. Or if not Bush himself, they fin- ger his lieutenants, the cabal of warmongers, led by Vice President Dick Cheney and senior Defense Department officials, who whispered persua- sively in the president's ear and used him to do their bidding. Thus, accord- ing to Chalmers Johnson, ever since the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, Cheney and other key figures from that war had "Wanted to go back and finish what they started." Having lobbied unsuccessfully throughout the Clinton era "for aggression against Iraq and the remaking of the Middle East," they had returned to power on Bush's coattails. After they had "bided their time for nine months," they had seized upon the crisis of 9/1 1 "to put their theories and plans into action," pressing Bush to make Saddam Hussein number one on his hit list." By implication, militarism becomes something of a conspiracy foisted on a malleable president and an unsuspecting people by a handful of wild-eyed ideologues. By further implication, the remedy for American militarism is self-evi- dent: "Throw the new militarists out of office," as Michael Mann urges, and a more balanced attitude toward military power will presumably reassert itself? As a contribution to the ongoing debate about U.S. policy, The New American Militarism rejects such notions as simplistic. It refuses to lay the responsibility for American militarism at the feet of a particular president or a particular set of advisers and argues that no particular presidential election holds the promise of radically changing it. Charging George W. Bush with responsibility for the militaristic tendencies of present-day U.S. for- eign policy makes as much sense as holding Herbert Hoover culpable for the Great Depression: Whatever its psychic satisfactions, it is an exercise in scapegoating that lets too many others off the hook and allows society at large to abdicate responsibility for what has come to pass. The point is not to deprive George W. Bush or his advisers of whatever credit or blame they may deserve for conjuring up the several large-scale campaigns and myriad lesser military actions comprising their war on ter- ror. They have certainly taken up the mantle of this militarism with a verve not seen in years. Rather it is to suggest that well before September 11, 2001 , and before the younger Bush's ascent to the presidency a militaristic predisposition was already in place both in official circles and among Americans more generally. In this regard, 9/11 deserves to be seen as an event that gave added impetus to already existing tendencies rather than as a turning point. For his part, President Bush himself ought to be seen as a player reciting his lines rather than as a playwright drafting an entirely new script. In short, the argument offered here asserts that present-day American militarism has deep roots in the American past. It represents a bipartisan project. As a result, it is unlikely to disappear anytime soon, a point obscured by the myopia and personal animus tainting most accounts of how we have arrived at this point. The New American Militarism was conceived not only as a corrective to what has become the conventional critique of U.S. policies since 9/11 but as a challenge to the orthodox historical context employed to justify those policies. In this regard, although by no means comparable in scope and in richness of detail, it continues the story begun in Michael Sherry's masterful 1995 hook, In the Shadow of War an interpretive history of the United States in our times. In a narrative that begins with the Great Depression and spans six decades, Sherry reveals a pervasive American sense of anxiety and vulnerability. In an age during which War, actual as well as metaphorical, was a constant, either as ongoing reality or frightening prospect, national security became the axis around which the American enterprise turned. As a consequence, a relentless process of militarization "reshaped every realm of American life-politics and foreign policy, economics and technology, culture and social relations-making America a profoundly different nation." Yet Sherry concludes his account on a hopeful note. Surveying conditions midway through the post-Cold War era's first decade, he suggests in a chapter entitled "A Farewell to Militarization?" that America's preoccupation with War and military matters might at long last be waning. In the mid- 1995, a return to something resembling pre-1930s military normalcy, involving at least a partial liquidation of the national security state, appeared to be at hand. Events since In the Shadow of War appear to have swept away these expectations. The New American Militarism tries to explain why and by extension offers a different interpretation of America's immediate past. The upshot of that interpretation is that far from bidding farewell to militariza- tion, the United States has nestled more deeply into its embrace. f ~ Briefly told, the story that follows goes like this. The new American militarism made its appearance in reaction to the I96os and especially to Vietnam. It evolved over a period of decades, rather than being sponta- neously induced by a particular event such as the terrorist attack of Septem- ber 11, 2001. Nor, as mentioned above, is present-day American militarism the product of a conspiracy hatched by a small group of fanatics when the American people were distracted or otherwise engaged. Rather, it devel- oped in full view and with considerable popular approval. The new American militarism is the handiwork of several disparate groups that shared little in common apart from being intent on undoing the purportedly nefarious effects of the I96OS. Military officers intent on reha- bilitating their profession; intellectuals fearing that the loss of confidence at home was paving the way for the triumph of totalitarianism abroad; reli- gious leaders dismayed by the collapse of traditional moral standards; strategists wrestling with the implications of a humiliating defeat that had undermined their credibility; politicians on the make; purveyors of pop cul- turc looking to make a buck: as early as 1980, each saw military power as the apparent answer to any number of problems. The process giving rise to the new American militarism was not a neat one. Where collaboration made sense, the forces of reaction found the means to cooperate. But on many occasions-for example, on questions relating to women or to grand strategy-nominally "pro-military" groups worked at cross purposes. Confronting the thicket of unexpected developments that marked the decades after Vietnam, each tended to chart its own course. In many respects, the forces of reaction failed to achieve the specific objectives that first roused them to act. To the extent that the 19603 upended long-standing conventions relating to race, gender, and sexuality, efforts to mount a cultural counterrevolution failed miserably. Where the forces of reaction did achieve a modicum of success, moreover, their achievements often proved empty or gave rise to unintended and unwelcome conse- quences. Thus, as we shall see, military professionals did regain something approximating the standing that they had enjoyed in American society prior to Vietnam. But their efforts to reassert the autonomy of that profession backfired and left the military in the present century bereft of meaningful influence on basic questions relating to the uses of U.S. military power. Yet the reaction against the 1960s did give rise to one important by-prod: uct, namely, the militaristic tendencies that have of late come into full flower. In short, the story that follows consists of several narrative threads. No single thread can account for our current outsized ambitions and infatua- tion with military power. Together, however, they created conditions per- mitting a peculiarly American variant of militarism to emerge. As an antidote, the story concludes by offering specific remedies aimed at restor- ing a sense of realism and a sense of proportion to U.S. policy. It proposes thereby to bring American purposes and American methods-especially with regard to the role of military power-into closer harmony with the nation's founding ideals. The marriage of military metaphysics with eschatological ambition is a misbegotten one, contrary to the long-term interests of either the American people or the world beyond our borders. It invites endless war and the ever-deepening militarization of U.S. policy. As it subordinates concern for the common good to the paramount value of military effectiveness, it promises not to perfect but to distort American ideals. As it concentrates ever more authority in the hands of a few more concerned with order abroad rather than with justice at home, it will accelerate the hollowing out of American democracy. As it alienates peoples and nations around the world, it will leave the United States increasingly isolated. If history is any guide, it will end in bankruptcy, moral as well as economic, and in abject failure. "Of all the enemies of public liberty," wrote James Madison in 1795, "war is perhaps the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies. From these proceed debts and taxes. And armies, debts and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few .... No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual Warfare." The purpose of this book is to invite Americans to consider the continued relevance of Madison's warning to our own time and circumstances.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC.

#### Trying to restrict and regulate the self inevitably fails and destroys value to life – the interrogation of the 1AC forces self-reflection and self-shaming that enables us to engage with the political in new and emancipatory ways

Ojakangas 13, Mika Ojakangas, faculty member of the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, “Eremos Aporos as the Paradigmatic Figure of Western (Thanato) Political Subject,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, August 4, 2013, vol. 38, iss. 194

\*\*\*gendered language not endorsed

One is now of course tempted to ask, what is the experience of contradiction in the sphere of morality? In the tradition of the West, this experience has been called the experience of bad conscience, guilt, shame, disgrace, and so on, but perhaps more important than any of these terms, denoting usually one aspect of the wholesale phenomenon, is the essence of this fundamental experience—the experience the Greeks identified with synoida emautó (“knowing with oneself”). Synoida emautõ is a verbal construction at the etymological root of the Greek conscience (syneidesis), which in classical Greek could have a neutral meaning, signifying that one is conscious of something concerning oneself but which could involve a moral meaning as well. Common to all these ethical uses of synoida emautõ is that it expresses a proJò taid sense of disorientation—a personal, moral, political, and religious sense of loss.’2 It is this experience of disorientation originating in the experience of conscience that constitutes the essence of Socratic politics. Recall Socrates’ words in Ilippias Major (304c) I quoted above, “It seems to me that some divine fortune (daimonia tis tykhe) holds me back. I am always wandering (planaö) and perplexed (aporö).” We also remember why he is aporos, meaning “helpless,” “without passage,” and “without orientation.” He is aporos because the “relative” living in his place constantly accuses him and puts him into shame no matter what he has done. In other words, especially if we interpret, with Arendt, the “relative” as a metaphor for conscience, the Socratic conscience is not a source of opinion, not even of normativity, but first and foremost the source of aporia. The conscience does not tell Socrates what to do and what to avoid but merely disturbs him up to the point of absolute confusion (“when you’re in a state like that, do you think it’s any better for you to live than die?”). In the same passage, however, Socrates also states that it is necessary to endure all this, because he thinks that it is good for him, and it is good to him because he believes that absolute disorientation is the necessary condition of true morality and politics. Only the one who, by virtue of humiliation, “knows with himself’ that he knows nothing is capable of leading virtuous life: “I know with myself (synoida emautõ) that I am not wise at all” (Apology 21b). This was a new formula of ethics and politics in the tradition of the West. The way to true moral and political knowledge goes through the absolute disorientation in terms of such knowledge. All the known truths have to be relativized in the confusing experience of conscience because there is no true virtue without absolute moral and political disorientation. This is also the backdrop of Socrates’ famous “method” of elenchus. We may translate elenchus as “cross-examination,” but given the fact that the word derives from the verb elengkhõ signifying “to reprove,” “to disgrace,” “to shame,” and “to accuse,” a more illustrative translation would be humiliation. In fact, it is precisely the verb elengkhõ Socrates employs in llippias Major (403d) when he laments that his “relative” is always disgracing him: “I hear every insult from that man ( ... ) who has always been disgracing (elengkhõ) me.” Hence, the “relative” employs the same method of elenchus in the case of Socrates as Socrates, the gadfly, employs when he “cross-examines” or more precisely, reproves and disgraces the Athenians: “I shall,” Socrates proclaims, “question and examine and disgrace (elengkhõ) everyone in Athens, young and old, citizens and foreigners” (Apology 29e—30a), continuing that “I never cease to rouse each and every one of you, to persuade and reproach you all day long and everywhere I find myself in your company” (Apology 30e). In Theaitetos, Socrates likewise proclainis, “I am a most eccentric person (atopos) and drive men to aporia (poiotous anthropous aporein)” (Theaitetos 149a), adding that “those who associate with me (...) are in pain and (...) perplexed (aporia) night and day” (Theaitetos 151a). And, if we are to believe Plato, he was sometimes quite successful. Even Alcibiades, the proudest of the young Athenians, felt ashamed before Socrates, the self-appointed “conscience” of the Athenians: Socrates is the only man in the world who has made me feel shame—ah, you didn’t think I had it in me, did you? Yes, he makes me feel ashamed, because I know with myself (synodia emautõ) that I can’t prove he’s wrong when he tells me what I should do: yet, the moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways: I cave in to my desire to please the crowd. My whole life has become one constant effort to escape from him and keep away, but when I see him, I feel deeply ashamed, because I’m doing nothing about my way of life, though I have already agreed with him that I should. Sometimes, believe me, I think I would be happier if he were dead. (Symposium, 216b—c)It is sometimes complained that Plato’s Socratic dialogues are aporetic and do not lead to any conclusion, but, in truth, the only aim of such a “method” is aporia. In other words, the aim of the “method” of elenchus based on the accusations Socrates makes on his interlocutors is not to figure out what virtue means but, on the contrary, to reveal that all our conceptions of virtue are worth nothing and, ultimately, to elicit absolute disorientation in terms of morality and politics. The Socratic “method” of elenchus does not lead anywhere, or better still, it leads to nowhere. This is not a sign of the method’s failure, because it is the aporia that was sought for in the first place.’3 It was sought for, because Socrates believes that true moral and political knowledge can emanate from such an aporia alone. Only the one who, by virtue of disgrace and humiliation, knows with himself (synoida emautõ) that he knows nothing, to whom the world as a whole has become impenetrable, is capable of virtue. As Socrates proclaims in Philebus (16b), “There certainly is no better road (hodos), nor can there ever be, than that which I have always loved, though it has often deserted me, leaving me lonely and forlorn (ermon kai aporon).”

### Solvency

Drones policy is shrouded in secrecy – restrictions are impossible because of the lack of transparency – instead of assessing the information selectively leaked by the government, focus should be on the production of knowledge behind policy.

Toth 13, [Kate Toth, London School of Economics, Dissertation; “REMOTE-CONTROLLED WAR: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTANCING OF STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY”; Apr 27, 2013; http://www.academia.edu/3125323/REMOTE-CONTROLLED\_WAR\_IMPLICATIONS\_OF\_THE\_DISTANCING\_OF\_STATE-SPONSORED\_VIOLENCE\_ON\_AMERICAN\_DEMOCRACY]

With regard to drones, what the public knows has been released through leaks to the press that were likely approved by the President (Engelhardt, 2012). Though the government now claims the right to assassinate Americans along with foreigners through the drone program, “informed public debate and judicial oversight” are impossible because “its drone program is so secret [the government] can't even admit to its existence” (Freed Wessler, 2012). That is, except via leaks that allow Obama to craft a politically advantageous narrative (Friedersdorf, 2012a). Meanwhile, the use of drones has exploded domestically, and again, “citizens lack a basic right to know who is operating the drones circling their houses, what information is being collected and how it will be used” (ABC News, 2012). The Bush administration politicized science (Beck, 1992) by notoriously editing reports on climate change and pressuring scientists (Coglianese, 2009). This is instructive for the current debate as it exhibits that one cannot simply assess the information released, but examine this knowledge within a political context, harking back to Foucault’s (1997) production of knowledge. Writing about the covert drone strikes, Friedersdorf (2012b) in The Atlantic asked, “in what sense would we be living in a representative democracy if neither the bulk of Congress nor the people” are told about the strikes? One of the lingering questions raised from this debate is, how different is it if we were told the bare minimum of facts via leaks, so still preventing effective debate, versus being told nothing at all? When President Obama took office, in the memo outlining his “Transparency and Open Government” initiative, it was written that transparency will “ensure the public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration” and that this transparency will “strengthen our democracy” (White House, 2009). This is what Obama believes transparency has the power to achieve, and it falls in line with the access to information that Diamond and Morlino (2004) highlight as key to accountability in democracy. President Obama’s track record is, perhaps, an example of not striking the right balance between what, and how much, to release. However, given that many of the steps he has taken, both in terms of transparency of existing programs and secrecy regarding proliferation of new programs such as drones, it does not seem likely that this is unintentional. Transparency relies on a strong civil society to use the information effectively, or press for it to be released (Etzioni, 2010); perhaps this lack of accountability is also indicative of the weakness of current American civil society and media.

Utilitarianism’s attempt at neutrality tramples over efforts toward individual equality.

Byrnes, ’99 [Erin E. Byrnes, Arizona Law Review, Summer, 1999, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 535, We don’t endorse this article’s employment of ableist language]

A functionalist critique of utilitarianism could also be employed in this context to advocate the acceptance of moral rights and the theory of correlativity. Functionalism points up the problems with the alleged egalitarian underpinnings of utilitarianism by making clear the fallacy of alleged neutrality in the calculation of individual preferences. 271 By employing a functionalist critique of utilitarianism, affirmative action proponents can advocate the adoption of Ronald Dworkin's "model two" conception of rights. 272 Dworkin claims that all rights inherently carry moral force. 273 Recognition of the moral element of rights enables them to trump certain societal decisions regarding utility, which, in turn, strengthens the overall worth of rights. 274 Thus, adoption of a functionalist critique of utilitarianism may facilitate a wider acceptance of those affirmative action policies currently deemed offensive to our political regime. The belief of many is that utilitarianism "can...provide a conception of how government treats people as equals, or...[at least] how government respects the fundamental requirement that it must treat people as equals." 275 This notion dovetails perfectly with the utilitarian rejection of those affirmative action policies that go beyond the colorblind vision because such policies would violate the deeply held conviction that all people are to be treated as equals. Allowing for preferences or redistribution would be a clear violation of this principle. "Utilitarianism claims that people are treated as equals when the preferences of each, weighted only for intensity, are balanced in the same scales, with no distinctions for persons or merit." 276 However, this egalitarian justification of utilitarianism is selfundermining because of the critical significance utilitarianism delegates to the views of those who hold profoundly non-neutral positions. 277 The undermining impact becomes particularly apparent when viewed in light of the notion that the preferences of some should count for more than those of others. 278 [\*567] A proposed solution to the problem of specious neutrality is elucidated in Ronald Dworkin's concept of individual rights as trumps. 279 Dworkin argues that "rights are best understood as trumps over...political decisions that state[] a goal for the community as a whole." 280 In other words, individual rights are at their strongest when they act as a trump on societal notions of utility. Under the trump theory, individual rights are only strong enough to act as trumps on the societal will when they carry moral force. 281 Without the trump capacity, the commitment to individual rights that the liberal tradition professes is imperfect. A political system organized according to utilitarianism sets up a situation primed for the political majority to capture the means of process. Allowing for the trump capacity of individual rights to exist ensures that the political minority will be protected from the preferences of the majority, who often completely disregard equality or egalitarianism. 282 This is precisely what is behind the current drive to dismantle existing affirmative action policies. As Dworkin points out, when society allows the utilitarian predilection for majority will to go unchecked, individual rights get trampled in the process. The capture problem is particularly egregious when the preference involved deals with the behavior of others. 283 The reasons for this are two-fold. First, it can be said that preferences regarding the behavior of others generally involve moral preferences. 284 When moral preferences regarding how others should behave are counted in the political process, the so-called neutrality of utilitarianism is called into serious question. 285 Utilitarianism's purported egalitarianism is challenged even when the preference operating is one which deals with the kind of experience which the individual wishes to personally experience. The problem endemic to this kind of preference is that it necessarily devalues the motives and preferences of others, while simultaneously recognizing and affirming certain other types of individual preferences. 286 In the United States, white society's preferences are affirmed while those of societal minorities are disregarded. Utilitarianism becomes "unnecessarily inhospitable to the special and important ambitions of those who then lose control of a crucial aspect of their own self development." 287 This loss is the direct result of the inability of certain members of society to value and respect motives, other than their own, regarding proper means of self-development. [\*568] One way to ameliorate these concerns is found in a strong conception of rights. If rights cannot act as trumps on utility, then the guarantee of any one individual right becomes an empty set. 288 Such a conception requires that where rights exist, they not be abridged simply in the name of utilitarian good. The functionalist conception of rights rejects the idea that "government is entitled to act on no more than a judgment that its act is likely to produce, overall, a benefit to the community. That admission would make the claim of a right pointless...." 289 Dworkin argues that individual rights carry no weight when they can be overriden solely for the sake of utility. 290 The worse case scenario is the instance in which individual rights are abridged because their maintenance has become "inconvenient." 291 This is precisely what has happened in the instance of affirmative action. While initially, there was societal support for equality in the abstract, when affirmative action advocates started to argue for the redistribution of societal goods and the use of preferences, support dwindled. 292 In a regime honoring the capacity of rights to act as trumps, a viable claim for the violation of individual rights in the name of societal utility can legitimately be made only when there is a stronger competing interest. 293 What commonly occurs under a utilitarian government is that the societal interest in the maintenance of order and security is seen as a valid competing interest in the weighing of individual rights, the outcome generally being that the societal interest wins out. 294 Maintenance of status quo power relationships is made easy precisely because societal interests are treated as valid competitors with individual interests. Dworkin claimy s it is necessary to "distinguish the 'rights' of the majority as such, which cannot count as a justification for overruling individual rights, and the personal rights of members of the majority, which might well count." 295 When society has a right to pursue any goal so long as it is in furtherance of the general good, it renders impossible a sincere valuation of any minorityheld preferences. It is clear that when individual rights are put in direct competition with societal goals, individual rights will be annihilated every time. 296

### Restraint

#### Their assertion that American executive restraint can spur Chinese change is an orientalist fantasy organized around an idealized western subject.

Pan 13, Chengxin, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin University, Australia, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics Western Representations of China’s Rise, pg. 123-124

As well as perplexed by its false premises, the notion of the 'China opportunity' itself is often vaguely defined. If it means that China will become more like 'us\*, that only raises more questions than answers: Who. for example, is 'us'? This popular collective 'we', as noted earlier, is inherently heterogeneous and constantly contested. As a result, there is no single Western self for China to emulate, nor is there a commonly agreed Western norm for China to follow. Despite much focus on 'bringing China into the international community', Johnston and Ross acknowledge that there has been little attempt to establish 'who constitutes this community and what are the shared global norms and rules\*. To provide a remedy, they call for the creation of an ambitious "score-card\* to 'assess China's commitment to global norms, rules and institutions across time, across other states and across issue areas'.86 And on the score-card, Johnston and Evans include a key criterion in terms of 'whether Chinese behavior complies with US interests as American political and military leaders define them". Explicit as this benchmark may sound, what remains unclear is which American political and military leaders actually define what, given that 'American leaders\* are far from a homogeneous entity Further complicating the issue is the debate over 'genuine learning' versus "strategic adaptation'. Some define 'genuine learning' as 'genuine (if often incremental) transformation of elite perceptions'- but the problem remains as to what is meant by 'genuine\*. For example, does evidence of policy change qualify as genuine learning? Jack S. Lew argues that policy change is not a necessary criterion, but Iain Johnston argues that it is.89 Granted that it is, we are still unclear whether policy change refers to 'humane governance' or 'the end of the one party system\*. David Lampton believes that it should be the former. Bui for James Mann, 'more humane governance' is no political change at all, as it is little more than 'a new euphemism for acceptance of China's existing one-party system'.90 For some, though both the precise meaning and measurement of China's convergence may be messy and elusive, what really matters is that both China and the West have begun to share a common interest in engagement and integration. For example, both seem to agree that China is an opportunity for the world Both sides stress the importance of China becoming a responsible stakeholder. Bill Clinton observed first hand that Jiang Zemin shared his desire to integrate China into the world community.91 But there is more to such apparent convergence than meets the eye. Despite some of the common vocabulary in use, there has been a lack of common meaning on those terms. As Lampion observes, both the US and China 'can agree about being responsible powers as a general proposition but fall out over what the content of "responsibility" may specifically be'.92 Consequently, the two sides often talk at cross-purposes. When they do seem to agree on some common meanings, common meanings do not necessarily translate into consensus. Quite the contrary, 'a common meaning", as Charles Taylor explains, 'is very often the cause of the most bitter lack of consensus". ' This point has not been lost on Thomas Friedman In a BBC documentary he made the point that "What is most unsettling about China to Americans is not their communism, it is their capitalism'.94 Furthermore, granted that the West and China could settle on a common goal for the time being, that goal could turn out to be a moving target over time. Surely not all Western expectations of China are inherently elusive. Yet the problem is that as China takes one modest step forward, it often invites the expectation of another, always one step ahead of China. In this sense, the West's normative goal of changing China is not a need, but a demand. In the words of Slavoj Zizek, 'every time the subject gels the object he demanded, he undergoes the experience of "This is not that!" Although the subject "got what he asked for." the demand is not fully satisfied'.95

#### Deterrence theory is incoherent and cannot account for human error and acting irrationally

Payne 03, National Institute for Public Policy President, DOD Forces Policy Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 2002-2003, Missouri State Defense and Strategic Studies Grad. Dept. Head, Nuclear Strategy Forum Co-Chairman, Comparative Strategy Editor-In-Chief, http://www.unm.edu/~gleasong/300/su2006/keith\_payne\_fallacies.pdf

The assumption of the Cold War deterrence framework, that deterrence will “work” in the context of secure and severe mutual threats because decision-making will be well informed, dispassionate, and rational cum reasonable, ignores or discounts the variety of factors illustrated above. A comparison of the Cold War deterrence framework with the incredibly broad spectrum of human motivations, goals, thought and values highlights the point that this framework cannot capture the reality of human decision-making. As a result, it is inadequate at best, and potentially grossly misleading. The introduction of nuclear weapons to the mix of factors operating does not “fix” this problem. The tremendous lethality of nuclear weapons may usefully focus leadership attention on occasion. Even very lethal threats, however, cannot bring to an end the enormous capacity of leaders to have poor judgment, impaired rationality, to pursue “unreasonable” goals and embrace unreasonable values, to be ignorant, passionate, foolish, arrogant, or selectively attentive to risks and costs, and to base their actions on severely distorted perceptions of reality. As much as we might wish it not to be so, these factors play to some degree in virtually all crisis decision-making, and in some crises, they— not the particular character of the nuclear balance—will dominate decision-making. This conclusion ultimately calls into question confidence in the Cold War deterrence framework.

Accident can never be prevented or adequately represented—the idea that it can be eliminated was the logic behind the Iraq war, making warfare inevitable.

**Smith 2008** (Jillian, North Florida English Dept, Tolerating the Intolerable, Enduring the Unendurable:

Representing the Accident in Driver's Education Films, Postmodern Culture 19:1 September)

In emphasizing Freud's comment that "accumulation puts an end to the impression of chance," Virilio reveals perhaps an overdependence on the forces of reason and intention in the accident and its prevention. Reason makes us ignorant [sic] to the accident as event. Here it is worth repeating the Ballard epigraph to this essay: "reason rationalizes reality . . . providing a more palatable or convenient explanation, and there are so many subjects today about which we should not be reasonable" (54). If one cannot see chance, productive irrationality, unreason-if one cannot see that there is that which one cannot see because of these elements-one will never see the accident, even the intended accident. **To assert reason and reflection in order to deny chance is to begin a reactive response to accident that, while it may indeed service prevention in this accident or that accident, more importantly, and dangerously, grounds the belief that the accident can be represented and thereby prevented. Was this not the logic used in the United States' targeting of Iraq as the source of past and future accidents? Rather than recognizing the dynamic distribution of terrorist elements, the Bush Administration found it easier to point to this contained, representable, geopolitical entity in order to organize its own decisive action**-the classic sensory-motor logic of conventional narrative cinema, stimulus-response, further organized by the accompanying agents, the all-too-representable good guys and bad guys. The accident of perception that Virilio worries over, far from being the result of a lack of critical distance, is rather more the result of critical distance. The images of accidents that are shown to students in driver's education can never be the accident that awaits them, and the accident that awaits them can never be known in advance. Must we nonetheless respond to accidents of the past and the future? Yes. But too often **reactive responses marshal their representational products in an assertion of secure knowledge that obscures the very difficulty and difference that accident presents**. When Secretary of State Colin Powell presented his obligatory photographic evidence before the United Nations in 2003 in preparation for the United States' war on Iraq, his primary rhetorical grounds lay in the securing function of representation that would warrant action, action that promised to restore to time its coherence and linearity. Securing representation is the first move in securing the United States. To **counter the fear of the indeterminate interval, the potential of the accident as perhaps a new logic of productivity,** the Bush Administration asserted transcendental object categories: the "axis of evil," "yellow cake," "aluminum tubes." These entities, now known quantities, would return time itself to us by anchoring the disorganized time of the interval. Just like in the movies, **stimulus-response is the form of action that structures the logical beginning, middle, and end, and would enable us to close the whole**. Action ensures the end. How many reasonable men and women, after all, reflectively took the photograph of aluminum tubes that Secretary Powell presented as representational evidence of a pending nuclear accident, of the accident to come that threatens the chaotic destruction of time itself? How many rational people recognized in this accident the need for swift action, action that would rescue time through resolution-we stand here before you with the evidence of what the enemy has done in the *past*; therefore, we must determine the *future* with action that resolves this *present* problem. Yet the reasoned response to these representations of accident did not inaugurate a recognizable duration of time with a sensible end, but rather has opened multiplicity without end.

Production of North Korea as a threat crowd out the possibilities for interactions that don’t include violence

Bleiker, ‘3, Roland Bleiker, PhD in International Relations at ANU, professor of international relations at the University of Queensland, 11/18/2003, International Affairs Volume 79 Issue 4, Pages 719 – 737 (http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118868835/

abstract).

The conflict pattern had been set long before the latest crisis unfolded. Several scholars, most notably Bruce Cumings and Hazel Smith, have for years drawn attention to Washington’s inability to see North Korea as anything but a dangerous and unpredictable rogue state.51 A look at the deeply embedded nature of this policy attitude is thus in order, even if it entails a brief detour from the imme- diate issue of Korean security. Central here is the transition from the Cold War to a new world order. While the global Cold War power structures collapsed like a house of cards, the mindsets that these structures produced turned out to be far more resilient. Cold War thinking patterns remain deeply entrenched in US foreign policy, not least because virtually all of its influential architects rose to power or passed their formative political years during the Cold War. As a result, security has in essence remained a dualistic affair: an effort to protect a safe inside from a threatening outside. Once the danger of communism had vanished, security had to be articulated with reference to a new Feindbild, a new threatening other that could provide a sense of identity, order and safety at home. ‘I’m running out of demons. I’m running out of villains,’ said US general Colin Powell in 1991. ‘I’m down to Castro and Kim Il Sung.’52 Rogue states were among the new threat images that rose to prominence when Cold War ideological schism gave way to a more blurred picture of global politics.53 And North Korea became the rogue par excellence: the totalitarian state that disregards human rights and aspires to possess weapons of mass destruction; the one that lies outside the sphere of good and is to be watched, contained and controlled. But there is far more to this practice of ‘othering’ than meets the eye. Robert Dujarric hits the nail on the head when identifying why some of the key rogue states, such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran or Libya, are constituted as ‘rogue’ by the US. It cannot be their authoritarian nature and their human rights violations alone, for many other states, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have an equally appalling record. Nor can it be that they possess or aspire to possess weapons of mass destruction. Otherwise states like India, Pakistan or Israel would be constituted as rogues too. Dujarric stresses that rogue states above all share one common characteristic: ‘they are small or medium nations that have achieved some success in thwarting American policy.’54 The tendency to demonize rogue states considerably intensified following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001. For some policy-makers and political commentators, the American reaction to these events signified a fundamentally new approach to foreign policy. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld heralds the arrival of ‘new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting’.55 Stephen Walt, likewise, speaks of ‘the most rapid and dramatic change in the history of US foreign policy’.56 Significant changes did, indeed, take place. The inclusion of a preventive first-strike option, for instance, is a radical departure from previous approaches, which revolved around a more defence- oriented military policy. But at a more fundamental, conceptual level, there is far more continuity than change in the US position. Indeed, one can clearly detect a strong desire to return to the reassuring familiarity of dualistic and militaristic thinking patterns that dominated foreign policy during the Cold War. The new US foreign policy re-established the sense of order and certitude that had existed during the Cold War: an inside/outside world in which, according to the words of President George W. Bush, ‘you are either with us or against us.’57 Once again, the world is divided into ‘good’ and ‘evil’; once again, military means occupy a key, if not the only, role in protecting the former against the latter. ‘The opposition between good and evil is not negotiable,’ Allan Bloom noted at the time of Ronald Reagan’s presidency. It is a question of principles, and thus ‘a cause of war’.58 Expressed in other words, the rhetoric of evil moves the concept of rogue states into the realm of irrationality. ‘Evil’ is in essence a term of condemnation for a phenomenon that can neither be fully compre- hended nor addressed other than through militaristic forms of dissuasion and retaliation. This is why various commentators believe that the rhetoric of evil is an ‘analytical cul de sac’ that prevents, rather than encourages, understanding. Some go as far as arguing that a rhetoric of evil entails an ‘evasion of account- ability’, for the normative connotations of the term inevitably lead to policy positions that ‘deny negotiations and compromise’.59 How is it, indeed, possible to negotiate with evil without being implicated in it? ‘

Internationalization of U.S. law spurs interventions and coopts international bodies causing mass war and suffering

Martinot 03 [2003, Steve, lecturer at San Francisco State University in the Center for Interdisciplinary Programs, “The Cultural Roots of Interventionism in the US,” Social Justice Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 19-20]

"Internationalization" of U.S. law was extended further by the 1991 bombing of Iraq, and later by the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia. In those cases, the person named criminal had not violated U.S. law. Nevertheless, the U.S. government chose to proclaim a violation. Saddam Hussein was charged with aggression against Kuwait, though the reality of what had transpired between the two countries was left unspoken.(FN8) Slobodan Milosevich was charged with human rights violations in his own country, though NATO's involvement in Serbian internal affairs was similarly swept out of sight.(FN9) The two interventions had similar goals: to force Iraq out of Kuwait and to force Serbia out of Kosovo. Both were manifested through inappropriate international bodies. In the first case, a U.N. peacekeeping organization was used to make war; in the second, NATO used an international treaty organization to resolve an internal matter in a non-signatory sovereign nation. The first occurred in total rejection of Iraq's willingness to negotiate its withdrawal from Kuwait (it had, in fact, negotiated its invasion of Kuwait with the U.S.); the second was promulgated through ultimatums designed to nullify Serbian sovereignty (that is, that Serbia negotiate the erasure of its existence as a negotiant).(FN10) Ultimately, Kuwait and Kosovo were seized and occupied militarily by the U.S. (or NATO) after enormously destructive technological assaults, as if that had been the goal all along. In effect, international bodies designed to preserve sovereignty and oversee international peace were transformed into war councils against national sovereignty, in violation of the United Nations Charter (Articles 2, 33, and 42). Coopted as proxies for U.S. policy, they were, in effect, "nationalized" by the U.S. for its own international purposes. Thus, their transformation is consistent with the earlier "precedent" of conflating U.S. and international law with respect to Panama. The idea of U.S. "nationalization" of international law implies the subordination of international law to U.S. policy.(FN11) The attack sequence (Panama, Iraq, Yugoslavia), in marking the unilateral usurpation of international law as an extension of U.S. jurisdiction to the international level, and subsuming it to U.S. policy, constitutes a massive rejection of respect for sovereignty or the possibility of "due process" with respect to sovereign nations. Rather, it substitutes the capabilities of power for the rule of law implied in D'Amato's theoretics, namely, that might makes right. In the process, the concept of war has been transformed, reflecting this transformation of international relations. It has become something other than war. Aerial bombing from vast distances of nations like Afghanistan or Yugoslavia, which are incapable of carrying on an air war, cannot be considered a war. When only one side does any shooting, it becomes something else, something beyond war. Despite having no real opposition, the bombing was carried out to full destructiveness. The conventional bomb ordnance dropped on Iraq in 1991 was the equivalent of six Hiroshima-sized A-bombs. Among the first targets were electric power stations, desalinization plants, and sewage treatment plants; that is, civilian infrastructure along with military targets (Clark, 1992). This, too, is not war; it is a form of "clearing the land"--Guernica on a national scale. Finally, even the concept of "costs" was inverted. The U.S. transformed itself from a creditor nation to the world's largest debtor nation during the Reagan years. Military action is infinitely more expensive than diplomacy or negotiations, both in a monetary sense, and in the lives and psychic damage to all concerned. Yet the massive violence, the displacement of people, the terrible wounds to bodies and social space wrought by bombing, was somehow preferable, as if conspicuous extravagance would offset the cost rather than augment it. In sum, the bombing itself appears to have been one of the real motivations for the assault. A massive ethical inversion lurks here in the disparity between a real war and wanton destruction.

### Legitimacy

Maintaining hegemony accelerates paranoid imperial violence – their obsession manufactures threats and conceals the US’ role in enemy construction – the alternative makes visible power relationships that enable endless warfare

McClintock 09, (Anne, Simone de Beauvoir Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, "Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib," Muse)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,”[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f4) and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. [End Page 51] I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state.[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f5) Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f6) Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. [End Page 52] Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f7) Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence.[8](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f8) Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.”[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f9) Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal. [End Page 53] Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty?

#### Their cred advantage forces the US to obsess with building its reputation ------ makes miscalculation and escalation possible

Press 05 – Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth (Daryl Press, “Calculating credibility: how leaders assess military threats”, Google Books)

How can these results be true? How can so many wise statesmen be wrong about the connection between past actions and credibility? And why don't leaders use their adversary's past actions to assess the credibility of threats? It is not surprising that Past Actions theory is widely believed. In our daily lives our actions do seem to have a big effect on our credibility. Friends who frequently cancel plans or, even worse, simply fail to show up on time at prearranged meeting places (e.g., the movies) develop a well-deserved reputation for unreliability. Their promises are soon viewed with skepticism. And it is well-known that children who are not punished for breaking their parents' rules quickly learn that they can do whatever they wish. But world leaders facing high-stakes international crises reason differently than people do in their daily lives. The dangers of international politics focus the mind. In our daily lives we quickly estimate the odds that our friend will show up at the movies, and we blithely calculate the odds that a parent will punish. But in high-stakes military crises people move beyond the quick-and-dirty heuristics that serve them so well in mundane matters; they model the current situation much more carefully. These conclusions are supported by empirical research in cognitive psychology'. Researchers have discovered that people use simplifying heuristics like analogical reasoning—that is, comparisons with the past—for everyday problem-solving. But when the stakes are higher, and when people feel sad, anxious, or threatened, they abandon simple heuristics in favor of more careful "systematic" reasoning. Seen this way, it is no wonder that statesmen do not worry much during high-stakes crises about what their adversary did in the past; not surprisingly they focus on power and interests in the "here and now." In fact, it would be surprising if people did rely on the same mental shortcuts that they use to make the mundane split-second decisions of daily life to make the most critical decisions they will ever face. The evidence provided in this book presents a new puzzle, one that is difficult to resolve fully. As the cases reveal—particularly the Berlin and Cuban crises—the very same leaders who are so concerned about their own country's credibility that they are loath to back down reflexively ignore the enemy's history for keeping or breaking commitments. In other words, leaders accept serious risks and pay great costs to keep their commitments because, they believe, to do otherwise would reduce their own credibility and encourage new challenges. But they pay little attention to the enemy's past actions, and they never use them as a guide to his credibility. In the concluding chapter I speculate about the possible explanations for this surprising behavior. To summarize, this book makes two central arguments about international politics: First, the best way to make threats credible is by wielding enough power to carry out the threats successfully at costs that are commensurate with the interests at stake. The key to maintaining credibility in military crises, therefore, lies in possessing substantial military power. But unless a country has serious interests at stake in a conflict, it will be hard to make threats credible, even if it does wield tremendous power. Second, Past Actions theory has been believed for far too long, at a huge price. Policymakers, scholars, and other foreign policy experts have held it as an article of faith that the theory is true, and their compatriots have paid dearly for this faith. This study has found very little evidence to support Past Actions theory and a mountain of evidence against it. Additional empirical work should be done on this topic—the money and lives at stake warrant it—but the burden of proof should be placed on adherents of Past Actions theory to defend their claims. Until a body of scholarship demonstrates that keeping ones international commitments significantly increases one's credibility, the United States and other countries should stop fighting wars in this dubious theory's name. The arguments in this book offer both good and bad news for U.S. foreign policy. The good news is that power is a key determinant of credibility. In this age of American hegemony, the United States should have little trouble convincing foes that the United States will fight to protect its most important national interests. The bad news for the United States is that even the world's only superpower will find it difficult and expensive to appear credible in crises that do not engage serious U.S. interests. All over the world the United States is involved in disputes that involve American preferences but do not threaten vital U.S. interests. Because America's enemies frequently recognize that America’s core interests are not at stake in their disputes, it will be hard to convince them that the United States will "go to the mattresses" to prevail in these conflicts. This book has broader implications for the conduct of American foreign policy: the United States can free itself from the self-imposed rigidity created by excessive concern over its reputation. U.S. foreign policy can be far more flexible and effective than it currently is. In every competitive environment—sports, gambling, chess, warfare—competitors use feints and bluffs to tremendous advantage. Probing forward—with the private knowledge that one will retreat if challenged—is a useful tactic for learning about an enemy's strength and strategies. America's obsession with the dangers of backing down has precluded probes and feints, making U.S. foreign policy unnecessarily rigid. Metaphorically, America's foreign policy strategists have used America's "chess pieces" as if they were all pawns—unable to move back from an untenable position—when in fact its game pieces are rooks and bishops. Understanding the real source of credibility permits a more flexible and powerful approach to foreign policy.

#### Staking hegemony on one test case causes constant intervention – this turns the case

Rana 05, (Aziz, Harvard University, Haunted by a Paradox: Human Rights Promotion and American Foreign Policy The International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 9, Iss. 2, 2011

The second key implication of the millenarian link between rights and security has been a deep-seated moral incoherence in American foreign policy. The need to view all local forms of violence as threats to global pacification has in practice meant distorting the meaning of these events. In assessing the Vietnam War, Raymond Aron wrote that, ‘What led to the Vietnam tragedy was not the concept of containment nor perhaps the imperative of nonresort to force, but the growing tendency to substitute symbol for reality in the discrimination of interests and issues.’18 What Aron recognised was the power of American millenarianism to cloak the nature of international political relationships. When substituting symbol for reality, conflicts are stripped of their local significance and given an abstract global meaning. Indigenous contests over power and resources are only understood in their implications for the US's missionary project. However, this focus obscures the real causes of local struggle and the likely consequences of foreign intervention. Aron also writes that the ‘domino theory, though in itself implausible, was a clumsy reflection of the correct idea that the American commitment is devalued by any throwing in of the sponge.’19 In other words, not only does such symbolism often distort the real significance of local events, but it also justifies constant intervention – the never ‘throwing in of the sponge’. The possibility that violence will break out and undermine both order and rights requires a continual and aggressive American presence. Intervention becomes a moral imperative whose only meaningful checks are the limits of practicality. As a consequence, the US finds itself implicated in operations of power that often compromise the original premise of rights protection. The abstract moral imperatives of human rights and global order produce the antithetical outcome of complicity in violence and imposition. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta writes, ‘Americans often forget that for every nation rescued and made safe for democracy there are many whose democracy had been rendered precarious by the exercise of American power.’

### Pakistan

#### Commitment to economic security is the prime justification for global violence and authoritarianism – turns the case

Neocleous 08 - Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (Mark, “Critique of Security.” Pg. 95-102)

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘economic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and ‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also ‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum ﬁgure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twenty ﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United States in September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justiﬁcation for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’ type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of containment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.

Their tie between ECONOMICS and Pakistan collapse creates the mental frame for war –the media PURPOSEFULLY creates stories of Armageddon and violence in relation to Pakistan to create greater profit – it is this fear of loss of the economy that creates the very conditions for war – we need instead a scholarship to transcend the perils of war and instead create a process of peace

#### Tejas Patel, March ‘5

[Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (M.PHIL) from the SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES THE UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND, NEWS COVERAGE AND CONLFICT RESOLUTION: AID OR IMPEDIMENT, http://www.scribd.com/doc/191254/Tejass-M-Phil-Thesis-MEDIA-AND-CONFLICT-RESOLUTION-2005, ACC. 12-9-2009]  
Galtung’s major thesis is that present **day journalism leaves out the most important part of the story – how a conflict might be transcended.** According to Galtung, **the way media operate while reporting on war and violence, they not only serve as catalysts to unleash violence, but are violent in and by themselves. Researchers** (McNair 1988; Young 1991; Wolfsfeld 1997; Galtung 1998; Kellow and Steeves 1998; Futehally and Shaheen 2001; Fischer and Galtung 2002; Kellner 2002; Tehranian 2004) **agree to the fact that media has the potential to escalate conflict by highlighting violence.** Botes states that there is a consensus among media scholars that conflict is news **and news is normally presented within some kind of conflict framework.** According to him,

Conflict being such a major part of news; **it has become a commodity for which all forms of media compete. Since conflict news is source of such rivalry, it is not only often dramatized or exaggerated, but frequently abused for commercial purposes** (Botes 1998: 4-6).

Galtung (1998), while criticizing contemporary media coverage of conflicts, claims that the media generally follows the 'low road' in reporting conflict - **chasing wars,** the elites that run them and a 'win-lose' outcome. He says that in present **scenario media legitimizes violence by constantly giving coverage to it and mostly ignores peaceful outcomes of a conflict.** Given Galtung’s stature in the field of peace research and his extensive writings on the role of media in conflicts, I decided to empirically test his critique of conventional news coverage of conflicts. In contemporary times, media coverage of conflict is more inclined to highlight violence. The constant coverage of violence and over simplification of the conflict leads to more violence and less possibility of achieving peace. Galtung (2000: 3-15) has argued that **media coverage in conflict largely,**

**• Focuses largely on violence,**

**• Reduces the number of combatants to two,**

**• Demonizes one party against another,**

**• Predicts Armageddon as the only possibility; ignoring peace measures and proposals.**

In order to empirically test Galtung’s claims regarding news coverage of conflict, an ongoing conflict had to be selected**. The India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir** was selected as a case study to test Galtung’s claims. The long running Indian Subcontinental conflict **merits attention because of several reasons.** The primary motive behind selecting India-Pakistan conflict was the fact that **there is not much direct contact between people of both the countries and the images are heavily media dependent.** Given Galtung’s claim regarding **media**’s role in conflict, it **can play a constructive or destructive role in case of India-Pakistan conflict.** Other factors such as the time span of the conflict and its dangerous potential to turn itself in to a nuclear confrontation were also considered while selecting this conflict to test Galtung’s claims.

## 2NC

### 2NC – Framework

#### 3. Fiat is not real nor should we treat it as such – knowledge production in the United States has been filtered to foster militarism and imperialism without question – interrogation of our rhetoric and justification of political action is the only way that we can engage in meaningful politics

Shor, 10 - Wayne State history professor

[Francis, Dying Empire: US Imperialism and Global Resistance, p32-34, net library, accessed 1-31-10]

In order to excavate and explode the mental landscapes created by imperial enclosures, we will need to confront and transcend the blinkered intelligence, impeded wills, and hectored hearts that are integral to the imperial and civic enclosures that surround us in the United States. These enclosures are enerated by ideological mechanisms, media constructions, and daily social practices that are deeply embedded in the political culture of an imperial U.S. From uncritical patriotism, induced by ruling elites and ritualized by the corporate media, to cultural provincialism, U.S. citizens are ensconced in an imperial matrix that distorts reality and nurtures "aggressive militarism" and 'escalating authoritarianism." "As the militarization of American society proceeds," contends Carl Boggs, "the confluence of the domestic war economy and global Empire generates popular attitudes inconsistent with a vibrant, democratic public sphere: fear hatred, jingoism, racism, and aggression. We have arrived at a bizarre mixture of imperial arrogance and collective paranoia, violent impulses and a retreat from the norms of civic engagement and obligation that patriotic energies furnish only falsely and ephemerally." Recognizing how falsely and ephemerally patriotism attempts to assuage the assaults of militarism and imperialism, a number of feminist dissenters have promoted "matriotism" as a key component of critical opposition. Among the more prominent proponents of matriotism was Cindy Sheehan, the anti-war advocate who became a lightning rod for opponents of the Iraq War after her son, Casey, was killed in Iraq. Writing in January 2006, Sheehan argued that a "true Matriot would never drop an atomic bomb or bombs filled with white phosphorous, carpet bomb cities, and villages, or control drones from thousands of miles away to kill innocent men, women and children." Beyond this critique of war-making, Sheehan urged those among her readers who would join other matriots "to stand up and say: "No, I’m not giving my child to the fake patriotism of the war machine which chews up my flesh and blood to spit out obscene profits." While flag-wavering patriotism may provide ideological cover for the mendacity of ruling elites and compensatory status for the powerless, it also reinforces the self-enclosure of imperialism. The desperate need to display the flag, from the phalanxes of those that now accompany the public appearances of U.S. presidents to the periodic fluttering outside the homes of average citizens, provides a symbolic ritual for imperial legitimacy. In effect, the more uncritical the kind of patriotism that rules popular imagination and public discourse, the more alone, insulated, special and different the American ethos makes people feel. The more it holds up a distorting mirror to itself and the rest of the world, the more incomprehensible the rest of the world becomes, full of inarticulate, hostile elements. That distorting mirror is not only part of the imperial narrative that represents the United States as the repository of good in the world, but is also a function of the role of corporate media's presentation of the world. Through the use of framing and filtering devices, U.S. corporate media, especially television, manage to narrow and exclude critical perspectives, leading to significant misperceptions. In fact, according to a University of Massachusetts study of television viewers during Operation Desert Storm in 1991: "the more TV people watched, the less they knew....Despite months of coverage, most people do not know basic facts about the political situation in the Middle East, or about the recent history of U.S. policy towards Iraq" Added to media distortions, misrepresentations, and complicity, the Bush Administration's deliberate policy of disinformation in the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003 further eroded the public's critical understanding of the situation in the Middle East and Iraq. Erroneously insisting on ties between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda and the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the Bush Administration and complicit corporate media helped to frame the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Such misperceptions persisted into 2006 when a Harris Poll found that 64 percent still believed that Hussein had strong links to al Qaeda and 50 percent were convinced that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction when the U.S. invaded. The kind of disinformation spread by politicians and pundits and reinforced by the media follows from our national and imperial myths which, in turn, bother literally and figuratively separate us from the rest of the world. While not a new phenomenon, such imperial self-enclosure does seem even more striking in the globalized and interconnected world we now inhabit. "As the American media has acquired a global reach," argue cultural critics Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, "it has simultaneously, and paradoxically, become even more parochial and banal." According to Sardar and Davies, the media reinforce what they call "knowledgeable ignorance" by acting as "the gatekeeper of what is relevant and necessary to know about Third World civilizations." Often, most evident in those mediage images are ones of random violence or poverty and disease unrelated to U.S. policies. However, it is not just those countries caught up in conflict, whether initiated by the United States or endemic to a particular region, that suffer from media frames that diminish or denigrate the reality of others' lives. "As a function of American narcissism," notes another critic, "American media tend to problematize all countries except the United States....The absence of self-reflexivity or a sense of humor and irony in viewing America's place in the world seems to be part of the collective habitus." Even when U.S. citizens are aware of some vague relationship between their government and conditions elsewhere, there remains a kind of phenomenological disconnection, inherent in life in an imperial culture, which impedes understanding of the causal connections. Commenting on the violations perpetrated against peasants in central America by U.S. sponsored militaries and para-militaries and the resultant gross violations of human rights, Christian Smith observes: "Most Americans probably were, in fact, concerned about these problems. But for most U.S. citizens, these injustices and atrocities remained essentially abstract and remote, detached from the immediate affairs that shaped their lives. It is not that most Americans were necessarily callous. They simply lacked the cultural and social positioning that would have infused these violations with a sense of personal immediacy and urgency. The lack of a cultural and social positioning is evident in the way some U.S. citizens continue to see the world through the same blinkered filters that inform the dynamics of knowledgeable ignorance. A good example of the misperception of the U.S. role in the world is how the vast majority of U.S. citizens continue to overestimate the largesse of their government's foreign aid. Although most citizens believe the U.S. gives close to 10 percent of its GDP for foreign aid, the U.S. actually gives closer to 0.1 percent. Moreover, much of that aid is military material sent to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. A fictional example, albeit representative, of such knowledgeable ignorance or imperial arrogance while abroad is the evangelical Baptist father in Barbara Kingsolver's 1998 novel, The Poisonwood Bible. Nathan Price stubbornly insists that every last bit of U.S. culture and horticulture can be easily transplanted in the Congo in the midst of the Cold War. With such imperial blinders and blinkered intelligence he manages to endanger his whole family, resulting in the death of one child and his own demise.

#### 4. Attempts to combine activism with policy deliberation kills the potential to create any change, the activism will always be co-opted and incorporated into current strategies of dominance employed within the public.

Young, 1 (Iris Marion, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy”, Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 5 (Oct., 2001), pp. 670-690)

Let us suppose that by some combination of activist agitation and deliberative persuasion, some deliberative settings emerge that approximately rep- resent all those affected by the outcome of certain policy decisions. Given the world of structural inequality as we know it, the activist believes such a circumstance will be rare at best but is willing to entertain the possibility for the sake of this argument. The activist remains suspicious of the deliberative democrat's exhortation to engage in reasoned and critical discussion with people he disagrees with, even on the supposition that the public where he engages in such discussion really includes the diversity of interests and per- spectives potentially affected by policies. That is because he perceives that existing social and economic structures have set unacceptable constraints on the terms of deliberation and its agenda. Problems and disagreements in the real world of democratic politics appear and are addressed against the background of a given history and sedi- mentation of unjust structural inequality, says the activist, which helps set agenda priorities and constrains the alternatives that political actors may consider in their deliberations. When this is so, both the deliberative agenda and the institutional constraints it mirrors should themselves be subject to criticism, protest, and resistance.7 Going to the table to meet with representatives of those interests typically served by existing institutional relations, to discuss how to deal most justly with issues that presuppose those institutional rela- tions, gives both those institutions and deliberative process too much legitimacy. It coopts the energy of citizens committed to justice, leaving little time for mobilizing people to bash the institutional constraints and decision- making process from the outside. Thus, the responsible citizen ought to withdraw from implicit acceptance of structural and institutional constraints by refusing to deliberate about policies within them. Let me give some examples. A local anti-poverty advocacy group engaged in many forms of agitation and protest in the years leading up to passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act by the U.S. Congress in the spring of 1996. This legislation fundamentally changed the terms of welfare policy in the United States. It abolished entitlements to public assistance for the first time in sixty years, allowing states to deny benefits when funds have run out. It requires recipients of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families to work at jobs after a certain period and allows states to vary significantly in their pro- grams. Since passage of the legislation, the anti-poverty advocacy group has organized recipients and others who care about welfare justice to protest and lobby the state house to increase welfare funding and to count serving as a welfare rights advocate in local welfare offices as a "work activity."

#### This debate is about competing methodologies. The 1AC chooses to footnote their own agency and call on the USFG to take action. This is the same logic that caused fascism to rise to power and it is the same logic that maintains militarism. Their presentation and political practice is one that forecloses any larger discussion of ethics and political agency that will recreate totalitarian violence – this impact turns your Mellor evidence.

Fasching and DeChant 01, (Darrell and Dell, Prof. of Religious Studies @ University of South Florida, Prof. of Religious Studies @ USF, Comparative Religious Ethics: A Narrative Approach, Pg.  42-43)

Interpreting our own historical situation is a risky business, for we are still too close to the events. We do not have the distance needed to put everything into proper perspective. Nevertheless, without such an interpretation it is impossible to identify the ethical challenges that face us, so we must risk it. In this chapter we argue that two major trends unfolded in the twentieth century that are of significance for thinking about ethics: (1) the phenomenon of mass killing encouraged by sacred narratives that authorize "killing in order to heal," as symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, and (2) a cross-cultural and interreligious ethic of non-violent resistance or civil disobedience symbolized by figures like Gandhi and King – one that functions as an ethic of audacity on behalf of the stranger. The second, we suggest, offers an ethic of the holy in response to the sacred morality of the first. The modern period, which began with a utopian hope that science and technology would create an age of peace, prosperity, and progress,ended in an apocalyptic nightmare of mass death, symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, leaving us with the task of creating a post/modern ethic that can transcend the techno-bureaucratic tribalism that expressed itself in two world wars. Technobureaucratic tribalism occurs when sacred narratives are combined with the technical capacity to produce mass death. While we do not pretend to offer an exhaustive explanation of the modern propensity for mass death, we do suggest two key elements: (1) the use of sacred narratives that define killing as a form of healing, and (2) theundermining of ethical consciousness by techno-bureaucratic organization through a psychological process of doubling (separating one's personal and professional identities),which enables individuals to deny that they are responsible for some of their actions. Through sacred stories, the stranger is defined as less than human and therefore beyond the pale of ethical obligation, as well as a threat to sacred order. At the same time, bureaucracies encourage one to engage in a total surrender of self in unquestioning obedience to higher (sacred) authority(whether God, religious leaders, or political leaders), so that when one acts as a professional self on behalf of an institution (the state, the military, the church, etc.) one can say, "It is not I that acts: a higher authority is acting through me, so I am not personally responsible." Yet, despite the seemingly overwhelming dominance of techno- bureaucratic tribalism and mass killing in the twentieth century, a modest but important counter-trend also emerged – a cross-cultural and interreligious ethic of audacity on behalf of the stranger, linked to such names as Tolstoy, Gandhi, and King. The purpose of this chapter is to grasp the ethical challenge of modernity as symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The purpose of the remainder of this book is to examine the potential of the ethical response to that challenge offered by the tradition of non-violent civil disobedience, symbolized by Gandhi and King, for a cross-cultural and interreligious post/modern ethic of human dignity, human rights, and human liberation.

### 2NC – Alt

#### It’s a prior question to all political engagement – we must interrogate zones of distinction and how they are politically structured

Edkins 2k, Jenny Edkins, faculty member of the school of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, “Sovereign Power, Zones of Indisitinction, and the Camp,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 25, Is. 3

\*\*\*Gendered language not endorsed

At the threshold of the modern era, then, the realm of bare life begins to coincide with the political, and inclusion and exclusion, outside and inside, bios and we, right and fact, enter into a zone of indistinction. In these zones of indistinction, bare life, or homo sacer, becomes both the subject and the object of the political order: it is both the place for the organization of state power, in the forms of discipline and objectification described by Foucault, and the place for emancipation from it, through the birth of modern democracy and the demand for human rights. This move of biological life to the center of the political scene in the West leads to a transformation of the political, realm itself, one that effectively constitutes its depoliticization. That depoliticization takes place side by side with the politicization of bare life. Bare life is politicized and political life disappears This irony is explained by the way the link forged in modernity between politics and bare life, a link that underpins ideologies from the right and the left, has been ignored. As Agamben says, “if politics today seems to be passing through a lasting eclipse, this is because politics has failed to reckon with this foundational event of modernity... Only a reflection that... interrogates the link between bare life and politics... will be able to bring the political out of its concealment.”0 Any attempt to rethink the political space of the West must begin with an awareness of the Impossibility of the classical distinction between private life and political existence and examine the zones of indistinction into which the oppositions that produced modern politics in the West—inside/outside, right/left; public/private—have dissolved. Agamben proposes that “it is on the basis of these uncertain and nameless terrains, these difficult zones of indistinction, that the ways and forms of a new politics must be thought.”’ in the zone of indistinction, a claim to a politically qualified life can no longer be effective as such. Alexis de Tocqueville’s liberal writing on democracy is exemplary of a political philosophy where the separations between ‘we, in the form of natural life or kindred, and bios, the subject of citizenship, are unquestioned.2 As Michael Shapiro shows, this leads to a strategic blindness to the political in family and domestic relationships in de Tocqucville’s discussion of America. It is only if we resist this conceptual tendency that we are able “to recognize that black habitation, for example, the social uses of the home, neighborhood and city, is a form of political action.” Shapiro explores the way in which in literary texts and in film, liberalism’s attempt to ignore the life of the oikos—in this case, the African American oikos—is challenged, and the zone of indistinction between politics and the domestic in which sovereignty functions revealed. Liberal theorizing continues to regard black (and Native American) life as a matter of ethnic, not political, relations: this life is the bare life of the slave or the native, not politically qualified life, which is seen as a white phenomenon. This treatment enables liberals to justify continuing inequality by blaming on, for example, differing family structures. It is a social, not a political, problem. Shapiro argues that an extension of political recognition such as has occurred in the United States, where blacks, women, and Native Americans have become citizens, is not enough since “it represents an enlarged qualification without providing an appreciation of the violence of disqualification inherent in the institutional-juridical view of sovereignty.”24 He calls instead for a politics of equality and an end to disqualification: for a politics not based on the discrimination of different forms of life.

### A2 Perm do both

#### 4.) Masking disad – glosses over the broader system of militarism and justifies violence

Douglas-Bowers, 13 -- Hampton Institute Politics and Government Department Chair

[Devon, "Beyond Drones: Combating the System of Militarism and Imperialism," Foreign Policy Journal, 8-7-13, www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2013/08/07/beyond-drones-combating-the-system-of-militarism-and-imperialism/, accessed 8-30-13, mss]

On September 11th, I will be attending an anti-drone demonstration in Union Square, NYC. This will be my first protest and I am quite excited. Obviously, the main goal of this demonstration is to protest against the use of drones around the world which kill innocents under the guise of attacking terrorists. While I welcome this protest, we must realize that this demonstration is not enough; that focusing on drones is not enough. We must battle the ‘War On Terror’ overall, as drones are only a small part of that. The global drone attacks started under Bush and have continued and massively expanded under Obama, with Obama going so far as to assassinate four US citizens (officially speaking). Yet, while this is extremely problematic, it is a symptom of America’s global militarism. Contrary to popular thinking, this global militarism didn’t start in the Bush era, but rather in the time of FDR, with World War II, and has continued and intensified since then. The US has, overtly, either already been involved in or started new wars/conflicts every single decade since the 1940s. This has created destruction all over the world, not just physically in terms of destroyed infrastructure, but mentally[1], historically[2], economically[3], and socially[4]. However, the problems go beyond just the military sphere. It has leaked into American society, and specifically into the social realm and how the American people relate to our government. Socially, this militarism has gone and allowed Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism to flourish in American society. It can be seen in everything, from attacks on mosques[5] to anti-Muslim ads[6]. This hatred and racism has heavily infected every part of our society to the point where it is seen as “OK” for TV pundits to spew anti-Muslim hatred. Americans’ relationship with their government has greatly changed ever since the ‘War on Terror’ was launched. While the government had previously spied on American citizens[7] (and even assassinated some[8]), it was mainly on those whom the government deemed a threat to the status quo. Now, the situation has become much more drastic, with the government spying on all US citizens[9], and has given itself the legal authority to not only indefinitely detain them without trial[10], but also to assassinate them (Assassination on US soil is still possible, given the fact that there are problems with Attorney General Holder’s letter to Rand Paul.[11]). At every level, the very people who are supposed to represent Americans have been complicit in allowing Americans to be spied upon and their civil liberties to be destroyed.[12] There has been such a breakdown in the rule of law that there are even secret interpretations of law[13] that the American people can be subjected to, but not know of. This growing authoritarianism must be confronted as well. Economically, corporations have profited quite handsomely[14] from the continuous wars of aggression around the world, as well as from the business of spying on Americans[15]. They are only able to do this because there is an economic incentive to create weapons of war and espionage, and to use those to great effect. In order to fight against militarism more broadly, such companies should be targeted for boycotts, and information campaigns should reveal to the public exactly who these companies are and how they are profiting off exploiting their customers’ information. There is a psychological battle to be held as well. The American people have become accustomed to their country being in a perpetual state of war. In many ways, some have become complacent at best, and, at worst, will actually support the ‘humanitarian interventions’ launched by the Obama administration. Just like with the drone debate, we should also work to have people realize that, while the names and terminology may have changed, the death and destruction have remained the same. This is especially important for those on the left, as there are many liberals whose hypocrisy has been revealed by condemning Bush’s wars of aggression, but support interfering in the affairs of sovereign nations now that Obama is at the helm. We must combat these hypocritical and uninvolved minds, lest we allow these problems to perpetuate. We must combat what Martin Luther King Jr. called “the giant triplets of racism, militarism, and economic exploitation” if we are to mount a truly successful attack on the drone war. The drone wars are a byproduct of the ‘War on Terror’ and its associated effects at home and abroad. If we do not look at this interconnected system, we will, in a way, be wasting our time as we will only be cutting off a branch of a tree rather than getting to the roots. We must go beyond drones.

#### 6.) Authority disad – need to question the basis of power – restriction isn’t enough.

Beier, 11 – McMaster University political science professor

[J. Marshall, "Dangerous Terrain: Re-Reading the Landmines Ban through the Social Worlds of the RMA," Contemporary Security Policy, 32:1, April 2011, 159-175, accessed 9-12-13, mss]

Although turned to a more progressive purpose, the rhetorical /discursive strategies of the landmine ban effect and work through a similar disturbance of sites of responsibility. The success of the mine ban movement owes in no small measure to the marking of antipersonnel landmines as 'bad' weapons - a move that has enabled even states that have widely used mines to join in denouncing them as a humanitarian scourge without simultaneously repudiating recourse to militarized violence more generally. At the campaign level and with the specific practical objective of securing the broadest possible ban on landmines, this was a very well conceived approach. Indeed, had this strategy not been adopted, it is unlikely that the movement would have swayed many - if any - states to the cause. But practically expedient though it may have been, it is also contingent on putting responsibility out of sight. Like errant cruise missiles. landmines intend nothing. What makes them bad, then, speaks not of disposition, but rather a technological limitation resulting in an objective property of indiscriminacy. While this might at first seem suggestive of the need for a technological solution. recall that, in deference to the goal of a com- plete prohibition, the mine ban movement quite rightly worked to foreclose the possi- bility of recourse to "˜smart mines`. Though this might appear to mark it decidedly apart from the war-enabling technologies of the RMA and their part in refashioning the bases of legitimacy in contemporary warfare, the mystification of responsibility so crucial to the ban reveals some disturbing points of intersection. On first gloss, the approach of the mine ban movement seems quite clearly to disavow any recourse to "˜better` technology as a fix for landmine indiscriminacy. The importance of this cannot be overstated since, as has been the case with the RMA, distinguishing between "˜good` and "˜bad` weapons raises the spectre of a like distinction in terms of the conduct of those who use them - a distinction not always well sustained by the actual consequences of their use. In refusing to concede that some mines might be less pernicious than others, therefore, the move- ment simultaneously refused all bases of legitimacy in mine use that might otherwise have been claimed by the technologically advantaged and denied to those less so. But things become rather more problematic when considered from without the narrow context of the landmines issue. While the rhetorical casting of mines as bad proved a remarkably effective strategy in pursuit of a ban, it only makes sense if it in fact is imagined that there are somewhere 'good' weapons. Since it is not killing per se but killing with landmines that is rendered indefensible, the use of other presumably more discriminating weapons is lent a certain legitimacy it might not otherwise have enjoyed. And this is revealing of the important sense in which the core claims of the mine ban contribute to the reproduction of essential ideational bases of the 'new American way of war'. Inviting none of the cynicism about motives that might have attached to a wholly state-led initiative, the central involvement of civil society actors in the mine ban movement - well known and respected peace and human rights advocacy groups among them - both naturalizes and valorizes a much larger constellation of claims to meaningful discriminacy, whether overt or subsumed. Pressing for a ban on landmines thus involved the complete disaggregation of this one issue not only from peace activism in general, but from the more particular realm of disarmament advocacy as well, parcelling it off in such a way as to suggest that there are more effective ways to do the sorts of things landmines are intended to do

#### 7.) Only confronting issues of sovereignty allows us to break free of the circular political practies that entrench militarism

Wadiwel 02 (Dinesh Joesph, completing a doctorate at the University of Western Sydney, 2K2, “Cows and Sovereignty: Biopower and Animal Life” Borderlands E-Journal Vol. 1 # 2 <http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol1no2_2002/wadiwel_cows.html>)

Such a political program has far reaching consequences, both for Western sovereignty, and the way that the business of politics is conducted. The living population of the earth has inherited a vision of sovereign power, which has spread cancerously into even the most seemingly inaccessible aspects of everyday life. This vision commands all, claims legitimacy for all, and determines the conduct of living for all within its domain. Politics ‘as we know it’ is caught inextricably in the web of sovereign power, in such a way that it seems that modern political debate cannot help but circulate around the same, routine issues: "What is the appropriate legislative response?"; "Is it within the State’s powers to intervene in this particular conflict?"; "How can we ensure the citizen’s rights are maintained in the face of the state?". To challenge such an encompassing and peremptory political discourse — where every question implies the sovereign absolutely, and every decision made refers to life itself — would require the most intensive rethinking of the way in which territory, governance and economy are imagined. In this sense, whilst Agamben’s analysis of bare life, and Foucault’s theory of bio-power, provide a means by which to assess the condition of non-human life with respect to sovereign power, the political project must reach beyond these terms, and embrace an intertwining of the human and the non-human: an intersection which may be found in the animal life shared by both entities.

### Solvency

#### Drone secrecy is the norm of the Obama administration – May’s disclosure of information was calibrated to avoid public scrutiny – can’t trust the state

Shah, ‘8/13 [Naureen Shah is an advocacy adviser at Amnesty International USA and author of several studies on the impact of US drone strikes; “Obama Has Not Delivered on May’s Promise of Transparency on Drones”; August 17, 2013; <http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/obama-has-not-delivered-mays-promise-transparency-drones?paging=off>

The past two weeks have seen an escalation in drone strikes more dramatic than any since 2009. The media estimate that more than 37 people have died in a series of strikes in Yemen. The US government has refused to officially acknowledge the strikes surge or reports of potentially unlawful deaths – just as it did, for years, refuse to confirm reports of the more than 300 drone strikes in Pakistan. On drones, secrecy is business as usual – and it carries on. Earlier this summer, however, there was hope for a different way forward. In late May, the White House released more information about US drone strikes than it ever had before. Following a major address on national security by President Obama, the government pledged to keep sharing "as much information as possible". In fact, since May, the White House has not officially released any new information on drone strikes (though leaks still abound). While NSA surveillance has taken center-stage, the government's policy of secrecy and obfuscation on drones persists, too. Past critics of the drone program – ranging from Senator Rand Paul (Republican, Kentucky) to Senator Ron Wyden (Democrat, Oregon) – should take notice. It is time to renew and expand the demand for answers about who is being killed. Instead of acknowledging the new strikes and describing a coherent policy and legal approach, the government has again chosen to selectively disclose information that raises more questions than it answers. Thus, an unattributed leak to the New York Times on Monday served up a major policy change in the form of a morsel, with little elaboration, that a recent terrorist threat has "expanded the scope of people we could go after". So, the question of whom the United States believes it can kill in drone strikes remains, as it ever was, full of unknowns. A handful of bullet-points on the government's "policy standards" for using lethal force, which the White House released in May concurrently with the president's national security speech, initially appeared to provide some guidance. But it expressly does not apply in "extraordinary circumstances", and since the embassy closures of earlier this month could be interpreted as providing such justification, the memorandum may not be relevant to the latest spate of strikes in Yemen. The White House could clarify this issue; better yet, it could move beyond conveniently malleable policy standards and describe how the government applies existing international law. Instead, the White House has again chosen to operate secretly and under rules of its own creation, which may permit killing individuals under a concept of "imminence" (of threat) that departs radically from all conventional interpretations of the law. Even more damning is that, in the absence of any commitment to investigating credible allegations of unlawful deaths, the United States appears indifferent to the question of who is actually dying in drone strikes. President Obama admitted in May that four US citizens had been killed, three of whom – including 16-year-old Abdulrahman Aal-Awlaki – he admitted were not intended targets. But the president did not define the identities of the more than 4,000 other people killed, or specifically address reports that a significant number of the dead – in assessments varying between 400 and nearly 1,000, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism – were civilians. When the president acknowledges four deaths of US citizens, but not 4,000 deaths of non-Americans, he signals to the world a callous and discriminatory disregard for human life. Perhaps only a fraction of these 4,000 deaths were unlawful. But acknowledging and investigating these deaths is a matter of dignity and justice – for the survivors of strikes, their communities and their countrymen. When deaths are found to be unlawful, victims' families and survivors have a right to reparation. Refusing to investigate deaths is a matter of disrespect both for international law and for the public's right to know the full truth. Many critics, before President Obama's May address, feared that foreign governments would follow the US to lead and conduct secret drone strikes without regard for international law. They should still be concerned about the precedent the US government is setting: refusing to investigate or be held accountable for wrongful deaths. The risk now is not just that the late May reforms on drone strikes were half-measures, but that they were calibrated to merely reassure the public, defuse criticism, and avert longer, harder scrutiny of whether the government's actions are lawful and right. A token dose of transparency may remove the sting of government secrecy, but it does not cure the disease.

### Heg

#### Staking hegemony on one test case causes constant intervention – this turns the case

Rana 05, (Aziz, Harvard University, Haunted by a Paradox: Human Rights Promotion and American Foreign Policy The International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 9, Iss. 2, 2011

The second key implication of the millenarian link between rights and security has been a deep-seated moral incoherence in American foreign policy. The need to view all local forms of violence as threats to global pacification has in practice meant distorting the meaning of these events. In assessing the Vietnam War, Raymond Aron wrote that, ‘What led to the Vietnam tragedy was not the concept of containment nor perhaps the imperative of nonresort to force, but the growing tendency to substitute symbol for reality in the discrimination of interests and issues.’18 What Aron recognised was the power of American millenarianism to cloak the nature of international political relationships. When substituting symbol for reality, conflicts are stripped of their local significance and given an abstract global meaning. Indigenous contests over power and resources are only understood in their implications for the US's missionary project. However, this focus obscures the real causes of local struggle and the likely consequences of foreign intervention. Aron also writes that the ‘domino theory, though in itself implausible, was a clumsy reflection of the correct idea that the American commitment is devalued by any throwing in of the sponge.’19 In other words, not only does such symbolism often distort the real significance of local events, but it also justifies constant intervention – the never ‘throwing in of the sponge’. The possibility that violence will break out and undermine both order and rights requires a continual and aggressive American presence. Intervention becomes a moral imperative whose only meaningful checks are the limits of practicality. As a consequence, the US finds itself implicated in operations of power that often compromise the original premise of rights protection. The abstract moral imperatives of human rights and global order produce the antithetical outcome of complicity in violence and imposition. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta writes, ‘Americans often forget that for every nation rescued and made safe for democracy there are many whose democracy had been rendered precarious by the exercise of American power.’

## 1NR

### Restraint

#### Turns the case --- Historically, the demand for Chinese policy reform causes miscalculation and military conflict.

Pan 13, Chengxin, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin University, Australia, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics Western Representations of China’s Rise, pg. 144

In this context, through its "China fantasy'" offshoot, the 'China opportunity’ paradigm is partly responsible for the hardline turn in Western approach to China. Herein lies the danger of this China paradigm and its strategy of 'constructive engagement". Engagement, as Jean A. Garrison points out, 'rests on the dangerous hope for regime change in China... This "hope"' raises expectations among certain constituencies that make presidents susceptible to political backlash when progress is not forthcoming".107 What we are witnessing today is in large degree a product of such political backlash, which, if unchecked, could launch US-China relations on a dangerous path of spiralling confrontation. In fact, such a path has been well-trodden in history. A cursory look at past Sino-Western interactions reveals that their clashes were not just due to their conflicting interests or diverging values per se, but also due to the recurring volatile dynamics of mutual hope and subsequent mutual disillusionment. Though no bilateral relationship can be free from the fluctuation of hope and disenchantment, in their dealing with China, the West in general and the US in particular have been especially prone to the pendulum cycle of paternalistic hope and 'rightful' disillusionment, with the end of each such cycle frequently marked by prolonged estrangement and open hostility.108 '

#### Alternative resolves the case impacts – Interrogating the 1AC’s knowledge production deconstructs the objective knowledge of the 1AC – formulates a self-reflective method to engage China with

Pan 04 (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 259-260)

This is not to endorse an ‘anything goes’ attitude on studying China’s foreign relations. Quite the opposite. For the range of social meanings which can be attached to a certain thing is not limitless, and under certain circumstances, it is obvious that some interpretations appear truer than others. Ultimately, it is the different practical consequences associated with different interpretations that matter. Thus, my point here is that while different meaning-giving strategies could all have certain ‘real-world’ implications, some implications are more dangerous than others. Therefore, when we assign some particular meaning to China, we need to remind ourselves of its potential practical effect, and incessantly bear in mind that such effect, if dangerous, may in some degree be undone if a different, more constructive meaning is given. In short, however tempting it might be, we cannot here return to the kind of ‘Hobson’s choice’ between either a new fixed, definite solution or no alternative at all to the continued reign of the conventional meaning-giving regime. Rather, the choice lies in constantly recognising, on the one hand, the impossibility of having a detached, God’s-eye view of some fundamental truth, and on the other hand, the possibility of formulating nuanced, self-reflective, and responsible ways of seeing an inherently changing world. Such choice, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, is not only clearly possible but also imperative in the study of a complex China amid the volatility, danger, as well as vast potential of contemporary global politics. A ‘choice’ which might indeed hold the key to world peace in the decades to come.

#### They guarantee war – conservative politics will hi-jack the plan – War policy is formulated on the imagination of policy makers than actual security concerns

Pan 04 (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 144-45)

Thus, the problem is less about the lack of transparency in Chinese official statistics, but more about the pre-constituted image of the China threat which dictates how China and its capabilities/intentions should be interpreted in the first instance.59 And at the root of this problem is in turn the positivist-cum-realist commitment to the search for an assumed single, essential reality which effectively rules out ambiguity, contingency and indeterminacy. In this case, neorealist observers rest on an either/or certainty: either China guarantees absolute peace, or it represents a threat—there is no half-way house. Since no such guarantee has been forthcoming from China (and I doubt it can be found anywhere), it must be seen as a threat. As noted before, this logic has been clearly at work in the construction of the Iraq threat in the lead up to the current invasion. It is no less evident in the view of Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen, who speculate that: If the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely…. Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences…. [And] U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all [emphases added].60 Consequently, the only certain conclusion is a China threat: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the island…. This is true because of geography; because of America’s reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China’s capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the technical, military sense.61 In consequence, in this relentless quest for structural certainty, neither China’s capabilities nor intentions really matter, since China is already framed according to a ready-made image of a strategic threat. Given the a priori belief that “All other states are potential threats,”62 the China threat is not understood contingently or context-specifically; rather, it is a meaning projected on to China simply because of its mere geographical existence as a state. Therefore, in the end, it is often ironic that some ‘China threat’ theorists sell their policy of containment on the grounds that China is not strong enough. For example, Mearsheimer argues that “China is still far away from having enough latent power to make a run at regional hegemony, so it is not too late for the United States to reverse the course and do what it can to slow China’s rise.”63 In this sense, it becomes obvious that China can hardly escape from this powerful discursive framework (by, as Georgi Arbatov suggested, simply choosing not to be an enemy of the West). Pertinent to this point is, for example, a perception of China as a troublemaker among some U.S. business analysts. As one report notes, when the U.S. economy suffered deflation a couple of years ago, China was blamed for ‘exporting’ its own deflation through cheap products; and now, when inflation rears its head in America, China, thanks to its buying spree in world commodity markets, once again becomes part of the problem.64 In short, what is called ‘China’ in this neorealist strategic discourse seems to have little to do with what is going on in China, but is rather a preconstructed, symbolised ‘national security concern’ for the West, and the U.S. in particular. 65 “What is disconcerting, though,” as Yongjin Zhang points out, “is the severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China’s [own] security concerns in the current debate.”66 This, I would suggest, is probably not so surprising once we understand that in the ‘China threat’ literature, the rational Western/American knowing self, given its mission in guaranteeing world order and stability, is assumed to have a privileged right to security concerns, whereas the knowable object (China) is by definition bereft of its own subjectivity, whose security concerns, if any, should already be represented by that of the former. It is at this level that, I argue, the ‘threat’ argument as ‘scientific knowledge’ has shown its most hegemonic character. The following examples help us explain this point.

#### This proves our argument – their method can’t reflect on how choices from the west produced Chinese behavior

Pan 04 (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 207-208)

My critical analysis of Western IR literature on China in the previous two chapters might well be objected to for the reason that it ignores the ‘hard facts’ on the ground. For example, liberal scholars may point out that the ‘opportunity for convergence’ is clearly real, for the Chinese themselves are talking about opening up, global integration, and joining track with international norms. Similarly, realist observers may contend that because the Chinese are caught up with nationalist fervour and realpolitik ideas and busy with military build-up and sabre-rattling in the Taiwan Strait, the ‘China threat’ is more than just a discursive construct. To some extent, these observers are right. Both the ‘China threat’ and ‘China as opportunity’ theses have certain ‘empirical’ qualities, and they were so acknowledged in the previous two chapters. Having said that, however, I want to suggest that the existence of the ‘threat’ or ‘opportunity’ reality in China says more about the self-fulfilling consequences of Western discourse as social construction than about its objective truth status. In other words, these trends are not pregiven, but have much to do with the very ways in which China has been so constructed by Western discursive practice. More specifically, in the first half of this chapter, I want to illustrate how China’s transformation into a more responsible member in the international community is largely a product of the Western liberal conception of it, which is in many ways self-fulfilling in practice. I argue, moreover, that this self-fulfilling prophecy also has its own limitations and paradoxical implications for China’s foreign relations. Thus, in spite of, or perhaps because of, its shaping power on Chinese perceptions and foreign behaviour, this discourse is unlikely to remake a homogeneous China in the image of the West. In the second half, I will look at how the Western realist discourse on China proves to be also a self-fulfilling prophecy with even more dangerous practical implications. But first let me begin with the constitutive influence of the (neo)liberal discourse on China.

#### The spectre of nuclear accident creates a permanent state of emergency that enables the government to impose its imperatives on all domains of social and political life – reflection is impossible in culture of speed – separate DA to the perm.

Kellner 1999 (Douglas, Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections

<http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell29.htm>)

In Virilio's view, the war machine is the demiurge of technological development and an ultimate threat to humanity, producing "a state of emergency" in which nuclear holocaust threatens the very survival of the human species. This involves a shift from a "geo-politics" to a "chrono-politics," from a politics of space to a politics of time, in which whoever controls the means of instant information, communication, and destruction is a dominant socio-political force. For Virilio, every technological system contains its specific for of accident and a nuclear accident would, of course, be catastrophic. Hence, in the contemporary nuclear era, in which weapons of mass destruction could create an instant world holocaust, we are thrust into a permanent state of emergency that enables the nuclear state to impose its imperatives on ever more domains of political and social life. Politics too succumbs to the logic of speed and potential holocaust as increased speed in military violence, instantaneous information and communication, and the flow of events diminishes the time and space of deliberation, discussion, and the building of consensus that is the work of politics. Speed and war thus undermine politics, with technology replacing democratic participation and the complexity and rapidity of historical events rendering human understanding and control ever more problematical. Ubiquitous and instantaneous media communication in turn makes spin-control and media manipulation difficult, but essential, to political governance. Moreover, the need for fast spin control and effective media politics further diminishes the space and role of democratic political participation and interaction.

#### Turns case – DESCRIPTIONS OF N. KOREAN “BACKWARDNESS” AND A TYRANNICAL THREAT ARE DRIVEN BY THE IMPULSE OF NUCLEAR ORIENTALISM – media narrative results in violent policy response.

Hugh Gusterson**,** prof. of anthropology and sociology at George Mason Univ., taught in MIT's Program on Science, Technology, and Society, 01 March **‘8**

“Paranoid, Potbellied Stalinist Gets Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, pp. 29-30 , JT

**One is struck, reading American media coverage of North Korea, by certain recurrent themes, stereotypes, metaphors, and storylines.** These suggest an overarching narrative framework shared by many journalists and commentators who write about North Korea. Whichever newspaper one reads, ‘‘the story’’ is roughly the same: **North Korea is a backward, isolated country run by a tyrant with comically eccentric, excessive tastes. His regime consistently lies and cheats and is driven by a childish narcissism, while the United States, which must manage the international system, behaves with the steady consistency of a father figure. Nuclear weapons do not belong in the hands of the backward, unpredictable North Korean regime**, and the question is whether, despite its duplicity and unreliability, it can be persuaded to give up its weapons, or whether the regime must be isolated until it expires. **This narrative construction of North Korea is fashioned out of shards of reality, but they are often assembled into a caricature that simplifies the messy complexity of the real world in a way that makes for entertaining reading but also, if policy makers believe what they read in the newspaper, unsophisticated policy**. In the following sections, I will sketch out the basic elements of ‘‘the story,’’ then explain how this representation of the North Korean problem harms our policy debates and how the media might better cover the story.

#### THEIR REPRESENTATIONS OF N. KOREA ARE STEEPED IN IDEOLOGY AND INACCURACIES THAT DEPOLITICIZE THE ISSUE AND GUARANTEE ERROR REPLICATION

Hugh **Gusterson,** prof. of anthropology and sociology at George Mason Univ., taught in MIT's Program on Science, Technology, and Society, 01 March **‘8**

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Given that the Korean dilemma is one of the biggest headaches for U.S. and other foreign policy makers, **good, accurate, detailed, and nuanced media coverage of events on the Korean Peninsula is vital in producing an informed public and a policy-making process that is judicious**, supple, **and intelligent.** While the **American print media** have certainly published a remarkable number of column inches on developments in North Korea, much of the **coverage has been repetitive**, unimaginative, narrowly sourced, **ideological, and,** at its worst, **baldly inaccurate. Such compromised media coverage can only** **hobble public debate and the policy-making process, to the detriment of U.S., and international, security.** In the pages that follow, I will anatomize the inadequacies of American print media coverage of Korea, focusing especially on the high end of the print media market that, presumably, has more impact on policy discussions. I leave it largely to the reader’s imagination how much worse things are at the bottom end. This article is structured around what one might think of as both vertical and horizontal slices into the material. I start with a vertical or chronological slice, following media narration of unfolding events, in particular the collapse of the Agreed Framework. The horizontal slice in the second half of the paper brings into view a number of ideological tics—stereotypes, assumptions, and narrative frames—that repeat over a decade in American media coverage of North Korea. **These recurrent representational tics depict Korea in a metaphorical funhouse mirror, making it harder to see clearly the North Korean problem and to find a way through to a solution.**

### Pakistan

#### Even if the plan is enacted it results in a far worse condition for the People of Pakistan – the plan would give a victory to the OPPRESSIVE Pakistani officials who aim to enact violence against its people on a much grander scale than happens with drone use

Ballock 13 ([Four issues Pakistanis can influence more than US drones](http://www.dawn.com/news/1076129/four-issues-pakistanis-can-influence-more-than-us-drones), [HINA BALOCH](http://www.dawn.com/authors/2118/hina-baloch) and [ZMARAK YOUSEFZAI](http://www.dawn.com/authors/2325/zmarak-yousefzai), http://www.dawn.com/news/1076129/four-issues-pakistanis-can-influence-more-than-us-drones)

US drone strikes have caused an outrage in Pakistan where thousands of young impressionable Pakistanis have taken to the streets. Until last week, the demonstrators had disrupted Nato supplies travelling through Pakistan’s northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to register their protest.¶ With political gains and expediencies involved, Pakistan’s foremost politicians have publicly canvassed the drone strikes as a violation of national sovereignty and honour. Public opinion has been diverted from the more organic and distressing issue of internal human rights abuses against Pakistan’s ethnic and religious minorities to the populist and emotional one of drone strikes.¶ While civilian casualties, as a result of these external strikes, are a reality, it is important for the people of Pakistan to also protest and denounce abuses that are a result of internal Pakistani policies and are well within the control of the state. However, political manipulation and lack of national awareness and public empathy have so far ensured that these abuses continue unchecked.¶ The masses of Pakistan are ideally placed to influence and pressure the government into stopping these human rights abuses against the country’s ethnic and religious minorities. Raising their voices against the four major issues highlighted below will safeguard their national unity, security and welfare.¶ 1) The fundamental rights of tribal Pashtuns¶ The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) usually see the front page of Pakistani newspapers when Pakistanis are angry about US drones. But little do most Pakistanis know that Fata is home to over three million Pashtuns, deprived of legal and political rights and faced with enormous economic problems.¶ Fata is governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) – a 19th-century law that the British devised as an instrument of subjugation and to establish the writ of the colonial authority.¶ Despite some changes made to the law in 2011 on a piece of paper, FCR in practice continues, over a hundred years later, to deny the people of Fata basic justice. The law has famously denied tribal people three basic rights — “appeal, wakeel, daleel” (the right to appeal their detention; the right to an attorney; and the right to present evidence).¶ It has been used to collectively punish families and tribes for the crimes of individuals. It has also allowed a federally appointed executive to exercise all executive as well as judicial powers, serving as the final arbiter of justice in cases, even including those where he is the accused.¶ Likewise, many of the political rights enjoyed by Pakistanis continue to be denied to those living in the tribal areas. While the tribal people have the right to vote, they do not have the right to elect their own administrative heads, known as political agents.¶ Political agents, who are widely considered corrupt, are appointed by the federal government and not accountable to the tribal people. Moreover, Fata has no provincial assembly. Federally, Fata has elected representatives in the parliament, but those representatives have no say in the administration of Fata because no act of parliament applies to Fata.¶ On top of denying these fundamental human rights to the tribal people, Pakistan has invested little to no resources in Fata. The area remains one of the poorest and least developed parts of the country. The people of Fata lag far behind much of the rest of Pakistan in infrastructure, education, healthcare and other basic services.¶ 2) The rights and lives of the Baloch¶ Hundreds of brutally tortured and mutilated bodies of young students, political activists, doctors, lawyers, and teachers turn up every few weeks in different corners of Balochistan.¶ Their eyes scooped out, genitals bearing marks of electric prods, limbs broken, parts of their bodies drilled and their faces lacerated beyond recognition. Yet, their tormentors still want them to be recognised and the whole town to witness the burial, so they very carefully leave a note with their names in the pockets of their blood drenched shirts.¶ This is the end that many young Baloch men meet in Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest and most resource-rich province that provides billions in revenues to the state. There are hundreds of people still missing, allegedly picked up by intelligence agencies and the military’s Frontier Corps (FC).¶ Their families move from one city to another, knocking on the doors of the judiciary, observing hunger strikes, holding sit-ins and demonstrations outside press clubs and covering hundreds of miles on foot to register their protest. Their aim is to seek an answer from the state on one simple question: “Where are the young and bright men of our families?”¶ The reasons for their abduction, torture and murder range anywhere from demanding a fair share in the resources extracted from their land to speaking against ongoing human rights abuses.¶ According to the Human Rights Watch, there is undisputed evidence that point towards the involvement of the Frontier Corps, Inter-Services Intelligence and Military Intelligence in these murders and abductions. The helpless locals have nothing more left to say except that their "lives are now clouded in darkness. Asking for our rights is akin to a death wish.”¶ 3) Stand up against the internal support for Taliban¶ It is widely accepted by the international community that Pakistan helped create and then later supported the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is likewise largely undisputed that certain segments of the Pakistani security forces to this day continue to support the Afghan Taliban. Most of the Taliban today have taken refuge inside Pakistan, near the Afghan border.¶ Consequently, Pakistan’s northwest, often characterised as one of the most dangerous places on earth, has become ground zero in global 'jihad'. The militants, many of whom come from outside Pakistan, have internally displaced millions of people from their villages, killed thousands of innocent civilians and subjected tens of millions of people to daily terror. They operate with impunity in Pakistan’s territory where they destroy the homes, schools, hospitals and mosques of local Pashtuns. They also attract US drones to the tribal areas.¶ 4) Pakistanis should protect the rights and lives of religious minorities¶ Prominent Shia doctors, lawyers, clergy and scholars continue to lose their lives to targeted acts of violence on a frequent basis. Shia neighbourhoods and places of worships remain a priority target for extremist organisations functioning across Pakistan. Hundreds of Hazara Shias have been killed in bomb blasts and other targeted violence.¶ Another ostracised community, the Ahmedis, declared non-Muslims by the state’s amended constitution, live in the dark shadow of secrecy and fear. They know that their identity, if disclosed, endangers not just their lives but also restricts access to jobs, education, housing etc.¶ Similarly, unfortunate for Pakistani Christians, this September, a church bombing in Peshawar killed 85 people, including women and children. Today, hundreds of Christians are languishing in jails across Pakistan, facing charges of blasphemy.¶ Pakistan’s notorious blasphemy law, which carries a possible death penalty, for anyone accused of insulting or criticising Islam, its scriptures or its last Prophet. The law has become a convenient tool to settle personal scores against vulnerable citizens.¶ The dwindling Hindu population is not any safer. Hindu girls in Sindh are frequently abducted by extremist groups and forced to convert and marry into Muslim families. With religious intolerance and sectarian violence growing out-of-control, it is hard to figure out what is worse in this state: To be a non-Muslim or to be the wrong kind of Muslim.¶ Conclusion¶ Despite such horrific conditions faced by the Baloch, tribal Pashtuns and religious minorities, politicians have led zero protests in solidarity with their fellow citizens.¶ There is a deafening silence and even a defensive denial by some leaders on the issue of internal support for the Taliban as well as abuse of Baloch, Pashtun and religious minorities. If anything, those often loudest about US drones have led the charge to oppose efforts to improve the conditions of Pakistan’s minorities.¶ Given that Pakistani leaders largely control the fate of these ethnic and religious minorities, the people of Pakistan can have a far greater influence to help promote equality and peace for all than they do over US drones. They, therefore, must speak for the voiceless. This is a way for Pakistanis to show that they care about the lives and rights of all Pakistanis at all times, not just when US drones are involved.¶